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Abstract 
In any policy-making process, governments around the world use various institutions 
as sources of policy advice and the Hong Kong (HK) Government is no exception.  
Besides the government bureaux and departments, the Central Policy Unit (CPU) has 
a major role to play in providing policy advice to the Government. This project 
recognizes this role by studying the institutional dynamics of the CPU in the 
governance of HK.  
 
Starting from its formation in 1989, the institutional structures and changes of the 
CPU are presented in four main periods, namely the pre-1997 era, the Tung Chee-hwa 
era, the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era and the Leung Chun-ying era. The institutional 
foundations of the CPU are then analysed based on the analytical framework 
comprising Ostrom's rules-in-use and Thynne’s concept of institutional maturity. 
Some recommendations are also suggested for the way forward for the CPU. 
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Chapter One    Introduction 
 
Focus, Objectives and Background 
This project addresses the effectiveness of the Central Policy Unit (CPU) in acting as 
a think tank for the governance of Hong Kong (HK).  The objectives of the project 
are to evaluate the institutional dynamics of the CPU, including its change in 
leadership, role and institutional maturity, over its 25 years of history from its 
establishment in 1989 up till the present.   
 
The project recognizes that for governments around the world, think tanks are one of 
the sources of policy inspirations and they can link “knowledge with power” for better 
governance (’t Hart, 2006). The CPU in HK is a governmental think tank which is 
responsible for providing advice on policy matters to the top government officials. 
With 25 years of history, the CPU is expected to play a more prominent role in the 
governance of HK as a maturing advisory body. However, due to various changes in 
terms of institutional arrangement, the orientation and functions of the CPU have also 
been changing over time. The project analyzes the institutional dynamics of the CPU 
from its inception to the present with reference to the four foci below.  
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Firstly, while a governmental think tank in HK is supposed to maintain its legitimacy 
in producing policy advice, changes of leadership in both the CPU and the 
Government have affected CPU’s core values over time. This observation brings clues 
to examine the impact of changing institutional arrangements on the governance of 
HK. 
 
Secondly, echoing the first focus, the project looks at the history of the CPU in four 
different periods of time: the Pre-1997 era as Period I; 1997 – 2005 under the Tung 
Chee-hwa era as Period II; 2006 – 2012 under the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era as 
Period III; and 2012 – present under the Leung Chun-ying era as Period IV. In this 
way, the institutional changes of the CPU following these four distinctive periods are 
analysed. 
 
Thirdly, given the specific periods of time, each of the four periods showcase their 
unique characteristics in institutional setting as a result of the change of political arena, 
the change of government leadership, and the dissimilarity in scope and authority of 
the CPU. The project further evaluates whether the CPU functions effectively with 
integrity under different periods of time. 
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Finally, as discussed, the CPU as the official think tank is expected to play a 
significant role in improving the quality of public policy even though there are 
changes in its institutional settings. Based on an analysis of the effectiveness of the 
CPU, the project makes recommendations and suggests future research directions. 
 
Research Questions and Associated Propositions 
This following five research questions are addressed: 
• What type of institutions could a government adopt to generate policy ideas? 
• What institutions has the HK Government adopted to generate policy ideas - 
and, in particular why did it decide to establish and operate the CPU? 
• How did the change in leadership, from the pre-1997 period to the post-1997 
period, influence the role, structure and control of the CPU? 
• To what extent is the CPU an effective and mature think tank contributing to 
effective governance in HK? 
• How could the CPU be strengthened and/or be complemented by other 
institutions?   
 
As the CPU is a governmental think tank with statutory status, it is relevant to 
consider how influential such a small unit can be in affecting the governance of HK. 
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On the one hand, institutional arrangement is a factor affecting the functions and 
impact of the unit. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that the CPU has 
long been criticized for being a “black box” which prevents the general public from 
knowing it well. At the times when HK faces urgent and important public policy 
problems such as those relating to municipal solid waste, shortage of land, ageing 
population, constitutional reform, and poverty, the effectiveness of the CPU in the 
governance of HK is in doubt. 
                                                                                  
Overview of the Analytical Framework and its Application to the CPU 
This project is structured and guided by an analytical framework consisting of seven 
institutional rules-in-use (Ostrom, 1999) and the concept of institutional maturity 
(Thynne, 2012), both of which are helpful tools for analyzing the institutional 
dynamics and the effectiveness of the CPU over different periods. 
 
The analytical framework begins by considering three categories of think tanks, which 
are universities without students, contract research organizations, and advocacy tanks 
(Weaver, 1989). Among the three categories, the CPU is a fully publicly-funded 
government entity which is categorized broadly as a “contract research organization”. 
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Its main functions are to serve government officials and perform research as assigned 
by government departments and agencies. The policy advice provided by the CPU 
usually focuses on specific policy areas. 
 
In general, scholars have various theoretical approaches for the analysis of think tanks. 
The policy elites approach, the pluralist approach, the statist approach and the 
institutional approach are the four major perspectives. In view of the limitations of the 
first three approaches which are described in Chapter Two, some political scientists 
adopt an institutional approach with more focus on the institutional structures of think 
tanks rather than their nature or role as a member of the policy-making community.  
 
In this regard, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework  
developed by Ostrom (1999) addresses how problems in the community could be 
solved by analyzing institutional phenomenon, processes and expected outcomes.  
The IAD framework includes seven steps in analyzing diversified social issues, and 
the seven rules-in-use are adopted as part of the analytical framework largely because 
it provides a useful analytical lens for evaluating changes of an institution over time 
and also for comparing different institutions. The seven rules are: boundary rules, 
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position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and 
payoff rules. 
 
An analysis using the seven rules can help reveal the uniqueness of an institution as a 
different set-up comparing with other bureaux of a government. It can be a tool for 
analyzing institutional changes over a particular period that influences the role, 
structure, and control of an institution. Analysis of the rules-in-use also exhibits the 
dynamics of an institution, with implications for how institutional arrangements affect 
governance and how institutions can progress over time. In this respect, the ideas on 
institutional maturity are relevant, including three broad levels : Level 1 which sees 
institutions as having “appropriate structures and processes in place”; Level 2 
maturity which is achieved when an “institution is functioning very effectively”; and 
Level 3 maturity which is achieved when an “institution is meeting high standards of 
integrity” (Thynne, 2012).  
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
This project primarily adopts a desktop research to obtain data and information for the 
empirical analysis. Newspaper clippings including news reporting, criticisms and 
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columns are the basis of the analysis. Governmental documents such as policy 
addresses, documents from the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the Administration 
Wing, reports and statistics are put into consideration. Various literatures form the 
foundation of the analytical framework. Other countries’ experience is drawn as one 
of the recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the CPU. 
 
A desktop approach is suitable for this project because different perspectives can be 
taken into review in the sense that governmental documents provide facts about the 
CPU and newspaper clippings provide information on how the society in general 
thinks about the CPU. Based on the analytical framework, the empirical material can 
be analyzed from different angles and the findings can be consolidated with 
recommendations. 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This project consists of five chapters including this introduction as Chapter One. 
Chapter Two provides the analytical framework by introducing the classification of 
think tanks, Ostrom’s seven rules-in-use and Thynne’s institutional maturity as the 
foundation for analysis. Chapter Three is the overall history of the CPU from the 
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colonial period to the present which sets out the necessary background information for 
the analysis in Chapter Four. Chapter Four uses the analytical framework of  
rules-in-use and institutional maturity as the bases for describing and assessing the 
history of the CPU to provide a thorough analysis of the institutional dynamics of the 
CPU, which results in different degrees of impact on the governance of HK. Chapter 
Five marks the conclusion of the project, including the main findings, limitations, 
selected overseas experience, and recommendations. 
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Chapter Two    Analytical Framework 
 
Introduction 
In any policy-making process, governments around the world use various institutions 
as sources of policy advice and attempt to translate inputs from these institutions into 
appropriate public policies. Among the numerous governmental and 
non-governmental institutions participating in this process, think tanks have particular 
significance in terms of their institutional dynamics and the impact on governance. 
They can be defined, classified and analyzed in various ways, which are addressed 
here as constituting an analytical framework for the study of the CPU. 
 
Think Tanks in the Policy Process 
Definition and Significance of Think Tanks 
According to the data of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the 
University of Pennsylvania (TTCSP), currently there are over 6,800 think tanks in the 
world (2014a). Although the term “think tanks” generally refers to non-profit and 
non-partisan organizations with a common desire to influence public opinion and 
public policy, the think tank community around the world is so diverse that it is 
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difficult to exactly define the term (Exploring Geopolitics, 2010). For present 
purposes, the TTCSP’s definition of think tanks is adopted, with think tanks being 
“organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on 
domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make 
informed decisions about public policy issues” (2014b). 
 
Think tanks could be independent organizations or may be affiliated with other parties 
such as governments, political parties, interest groups or the private sector. In many 
circumstances, they can play the role of bridging the academic and the policy-making 
community, translating academic research to “understandable, reliable and accessible” 
language for policymakers and the public (TTCSP, 2014b). Their output in public 
policy research and analysis are published through various channels including books, 
reports, conferences, seminars and social media. 
 
While there is no consensus on the definition of think tanks, most scholars also argue 
that “there is no typical think tank” (Abelson 2009, p.22). Many think tanks vary in 
financial resources, human resources, recruitment patterns, commitment to academic 
standards and operating styles, and the degree of engagement with policymakers and 
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the public. However, despite all these differences, scholars generally agree that most 
think tanks fall into the categories as elaborated below. 
 
Classification of Think Tanks 
In the face of the thousands of diversified think tanks worldwide, scholars have 
suggested various methods of classification. For example, the TTCSP created a 
typology with seven affiliations of think tanks: 1) autonomous and independent, 2) 
quasi-independent, 3) university affiliated, 4) political party affiliated, 5) government 
affiliated, 6) quasi-governmental, and 7) for profit (TTCSP, 2014b). On the other hand, 
McGann (1995) sorted think tanks into seven dimensions: 1) academic diversified, 2) 
academic specialized, 3) contract/consulting, 4) advocacy, 5) policy enterprise, 6) 
literary agent/publishing house, and 7) state-based, whereas Weaver (1989, p.563) 
identified three major types of think tanks that exist in the policy-making environment: 
1) universities without students, 2) contract research organization, and 3) advocacy 
tanks. Abelson (2009, p.34) agreed with Weaver and suggested the fourth and the fifth 
categories: 4) legacy-based think tanks and 5) policy clubs. Although the 
classifications from literature as mentioned above are based on different 
considerations and perspectives, they are complementary and mutually supportive in 
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nature. Key features are as follows: 
(a) Universities without students. Based on Weaver’s model, “universities without 
students” is understood as think tanks that rely on academics such as economists, 
political scientists and other trained academics to produce academic and 
policy-related research. One of their key principles is to produce book-length policy 
studies to facilitate a greater understanding of the diverse and important issues in the 
society. They devote the majority of their resources, which are funded “primarily 
from the private sector” (Weaver 1989, p.564), in research rather than proactively 
influencing public opinion. Institutions that provide economic forecast to social 
leaders would be a good example in this category. 
 
(b) Contract research organization.  According to Weaver (1989, p.566), this second 
group of think tanks have close ties to government agencies. Their principal clients 
are government officials and the research topics are set primarily for the specific 
government agencies. As a result, their research is confidential unless the agencies 
choose to make them available to the general public. Contract research organizations 
are created to give advice to the government on specific policy areas. 
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(c) Advocacy tanks. To Weaver (1989, p.567), “advocacy tanks” represents a group of 
relatively new organizations which have close ties to particular interests. This type of 
think tanks emphasizes “aggressive salesmanship” to influence public opinion and 
public policy on current social debates. They put efforts in translating policy research 
and book-length studies into brief reports and advertising materials, proactively 
appearing on media and newscasts to share their ideas and shape the views of the 
community on various policy issues.  
 
Approaches to Analyzing Institutions, including Think Tanks 
In studying various institutions, including think tanks in the policy environment, 
scholars have adopted various theoretical approaches which are summarized into four 
perspectives by Abelson (2009, p.63): the policy elites approach, the pluralist 
approach, the statist approach, and the institutional approach. The first three of these 
approaches are addressed below, followed by a more detailed discussion of the last 
approach.  
 
Policy Elites, the Pluralist Tradition, and the Statist Approach 
According to Abelson (2009, p.63), some elite theorists believe that think tanks 
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dominate part of the political system by giving their advice to and maintaining close 
ties with policymakers concerning the advancement of common political, economic 
and social interests. The top American think tanks such as the Brookings Institution 
and the Hoover Institution are commonly regarded as elite organizations with 
abundant financial resources and networks. This elite approach assumes that with 
proper connections with policymakers and philanthropic donors, think tanks are able 
to shape public policy and would often serve as instruments of the ruling elite.  
 
In reality, as pointed out by Abelson (2009, p.64-65), most think tanks do not receive 
generous donations and only live on modest institutional resources. Another limitation 
of the elite approach is that think tanks have different interests to pursue, so it would 
be impractical to assume that all think tanks are committed to advancing the political 
agendas of the ruling elite. This approach fails to address the question of how think 
tanks exercise influence in the policy cycle. 
 
Another group of political scientists disagree with the elite approach. The pluralist 
approach views that think tanks “represent but one of many types of organizations 
that populate the policy-making community” (Abelson 2009, p.66). Think tanks act in 
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similar ways as other organizations, such as interest groups, non-governmental 
organizations and trade unions, and compete for the attention and resources from the 
public and policymakers. The role of the government is therefore only to oversee the 
competition among organizations. The proposals and research from think tanks are the 
outcomes of competition rather than the right connection with policymakers. 
 
The pluralist approach is not without limitations. Abelson (2009, p.66) considered the 
major deficiency of this approach is its failure to explain why some groups can 
influence public policy, why policy institutes are often better positioned than other 
groups to win the competition, and the fact that they do not always face competition 
with other types of organizations in certain policy areas. The winning factors such as 
budgets, members or affiliations are unclear. 
 
Further to the elite approach and the pluralist approach, some scholars adopt a statist 
approach which emphasizes “the relative autonomy of the state in making difficult 
policy decisions” (Abelson 2009, p.67). It is argued that when confronting 
international and domestic resistance, the state and its actors would ultimately strive 
to protect the national interest. However, the state theory cannot satisfactorily explain 
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why the central state actors would pay considerable efforts to consult the public and a 
wide range of organizations before making important policy decisions. 
 
Institutional Approach 
Alongside the three approaches above, there are political scientists who adopt an 
institutional approach with focus on the institutional structure rather than the nature or 
roles of think tanks. This approach views think tanks as “a diverse set of organizations 
that have very different priorities and concerns” (Abelson 2009, p.67). It also 
concentrates on the involvement of think tanks in the policy-making communities and 
how policy decisions are influenced through discussions among different players in 
such communities. 
 
Instead of trying to identify which societal groups have impact on the shaping of 
public policies in the crowded policy-making community, “Kingdon and Stairs, 
among others, recognize that not all organizations have the desire or the necessary 
resources to participate at every stage of the policy cycle” (Abselson 2009, p.69) and 
they have their own priorities of participation. This observation provides a useful 
reference to the understanding of the role of think tanks in policy-making. Some think 
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tanks are interested in articulating issues and expressing their concerns via various 
channels, but other think tanks may be more interested in participating at the later 
stages (policy implementation and policy evaluation) and tend to share their views 
with the public. The institutional approach focuses on the participation of think tanks 
at different stages of the policy cycle and provides the bases on which their roles and 
effectiveness can be assessed. 
 
Ostrom's (1999) ideas concerning institutions are particularly valuable in their 
contribution to the development of a general framework that can be used to analyze 
all types of institutional arrangements. In her analysis, Ostrom recognizes that an 
“institution” can be an organizational entity or “the rules, norms, and strategies 
adopted by individuals operating within or across organizations” (Ostrom 1999, p.37). 
In essence, an institution is referred to as “the shared concepts used by humans in 
repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies” (Ostrom 1999, p.37). 
Apart from the multiple definitions of institutions, other key difficulties she 
recognized in studying institutions include the invisibility of institutions, the need for 
institutional studies to encompass multiple disciplines and multiple levels of analysis, 
and the configural nature of rules (Ostrom 1999, p.36-37).  
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Ostrom developed the IAD framework as a whole set of tools to solve the problems in 
the community by analyzing the phenomenon, the process and the expected outcomes. 
In using the IAD framework for policy analysis, one takes seven steps to analyze 
diversified issues (Reardon, 2011): (1) defining the policy analysis objective and the 
analytical approach in which the action arena and actors are identified; (2) analyzing 
physical and material conditions; (3) analyzing community attributes; (4) analyzing 
rules-in-use; (5) integrating the analysis; (6) analyzing patterns of interaction; and (7) 
analyzing outcomes. 
 
The IAD framework provides us with a foundation to comprehensively analyze a 
policy problem. Particularly relevant to our study is how rules affect behavior in the 
action arena and also the influence asserted by these rules on the outcome.  Rules do 
not refer only to formally written rules, but they also include informal rules like 
customs and traditions which everyone observes.  These are termed "rules-in-use" 
which provide a useful tool of analysis.   
 
Institutions, down to its basic components, can be viewed as a cluster of rules-in-use 
which pose incentives, opportunities and constraints. The rules-in-use are 
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“prescriptions about what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom 
1999, p.50), which explains how the rules of an institution affect the behavior of 
individuals. 
 
The behavior of individuals is bounded by seven types of rules according to Ostrom’s 
rules configurations (1999, p.52). The seven rules are: boundary rules (also termed 
“entry and exit rules”), position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, 
information rules, and payoff rules. These rules guide us to explain why an action is 
taken that brings impact to a particular position, leading to a rational choice or 
decision made and the accomplishment of particular goals and objectives.  
 
In simple terms, boundary rules specify the criteria determining how participants hold 
particular positions and how they exit from the boundary. Position rules specify a set 
of positions and the number of participants holding each position. Authority rules 
specify the sets of actions that participants in particular positions must, may or may 
not take. Aggregation rules specify formulae to weigh and transform individual 
choices into collective choices. Scope rules specify the set of outcomes that can be 
affected. Information rules specify the information available to each position. Payoff 
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rules specify how benefits and costs are assigned to particular combinations of actions 
and outcomes, and establish the incentives and deterrents for action. 
 
An analysis using the seven rules can help reveal the uniqueness of an institution as a 
different set-up comparing with other bureaux of a government. It can be a tool to 
analyze institutional changes and institutional dynamics over a particular period that 
influences the role, structure, and control of an institution. 
 
The analysis of the rules-in-use also exhibits the dynamics of an institution, with 
implications for how institutional arrangements affect governance and how 
institutions can progress over time.  In this regard, ideas about institutional maturity 
are relevant (Thynne 2012).  
 
In essence, four governance perspectives – “constitutive governance”, “warranted 
governance”, “interactive governance”, and “ethical governance” - are particularly 
useful in addressing an institution’s core existence, power, relationships with other 
bodies, and moral disposition (Thynne 2012, p.38-39). Under each perspective are 
three “ascending levels of institutional maturity” (Thynne 2012, p.38), with Level 1 
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being the easiest to achieve and Level 3 being the most difficult to attain. The three 
levels of maturity are summarized as follows: 
 
Level 1 maturity sees institutions as having “appropriate structures and processes in 
place” (Thynne 2012, p.40). This first level of maturity is relatively easy to 
accomplish. It emphasizes on formal establishments and the “matching of structures 
to functions”, and aims at either creating “appropriate institutions” or ensuring the 
“retention and enhancement” of the existing ones. Institutions that belong to this level 
are those “orderly shells” which exercise power based on law, interact with other 
bodies in a coordinative manner to satisfy specific and mutually advantageous goals, 
and have codes of conduct in place. 
 
Level 2 maturity is achieved when an “institution is functioning very effectively” 
(Thynne 2012, p.41). This level of maturity is more demanding than Level 1 as 
structures, power, interaction and ethics must be aligned in such a way that people 
operate with each other through its structure, exercise power, collaborate with each 
other, and pay attention to ethical behavior. Institutions are expected to “synchronize 
their own tools and methods with the demands of acting on behalf of others and the 
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public good” (Thynne 2012, p.41). They get involved in “the exercise of lawful 
power” where the underlying and guiding value is a matter of concern. Collaboration 
and interaction are required in order to bring about “mutual understanding” and 
“collaborative success”. Ethical standards are internalized into the institutional 
culture. 
 
Level 3 maturity is achieved when an “institution is meeting high standards of 
integrity” (Thynne 2012, p.41). Level 3 maturity, being the highest level, is best 
represented by “the emergence of institutions as living entities, supported by the 
endorsement of their power, the conflative quality of their relationships, and the 
embodiment of ethical standards in all of their activities” (Thynne 2012, p.42). While 
many institutions have the potential to progress from the stage of “an orderly shell” in 
Level 1, only a limited number of them can become “a responsive, adaptive organism 
with high integrity”. Thus, Level 3 is perceived as the ideal in each of the four 
governance perspectives. 
 
The advancement of institutional maturity depends much on the specific types of 
leaders at different levels. Different leadership styles are likely to lead to different 
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conditions, operations and influences of the level of integrity of an institution. 
 
Concluding Comments 
Given the multiple definitions and diversified classification of think tanks, it is useful 
to carry out institutional analysis by adopting Ostrom’s definition of “institution” and 
the associated seven rules-in-use: boundary rules, position rules, scope rules, authority 
rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and payoff rules. These interrelated rules 
have direct impact on an action situation and they offer an explanation of the 
participants’ actions and outcomes. While changes in the rules-in-use can reveal the 
development of organizations over time, the idea of institutional maturity is 
particularly relevant to analyzing the progression or regression of organizations in 
terms of their core existence, power, external relationships and moral disposition. The 
two concepts bring together a systematic method for analyzing the institutional 
arrangements of any organizations. 
 
The related concepts form an analytical lens through which the CPU as a 
governmental think tank can be analyzed in detail.  CPU’s institutional structures 
and changes along its history from establishment to the present is first examined.   
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CPU’s institutional foundations and maturity in four periods as guided by the 
analytical framework are then studied. The major findings and recommendations are 
presented in the final chapter.  
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Chapter Three     
Policy Research, Advice and the Central Policy Unit:  
Institutional Structures and Changes  
 
Introduction 
The HK Government, similar to other governments around the world, relies on 
different institutions for policy advice. They include internal sources, such as the 
government bureaux and departments; and external sources, such as external 
consultants, academics and think tanks. The CPU is one of the sources of policy 
advice for the HK Government. It was set up in 1989 as one of the recommendations 
of the Hays Consultancy (Ma 1998, p.128) and has continued its role from post-1997 
handover until the present. This chapter presents the institutional structures and 
changes of the CPU since its formation in four main periods: the pre-1997 era, the 
Tung Chee-hwa era, the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era and the Leung Chun-ying era.  
 
Period I: Pre-1997 era  
HK was a British colony from the early nineteenth century to 1997. After the World 
War II, the British Government carried out a large scale research on the future 
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development of her colonies over the world, and that was the prototype of policy 
research for the HK colonial government. The focuses of the research were to 
maintain political stability of the colonial government, to consolidate colonial rule, 
and to guarantee the ultimate benefits to the British Government (Scott 2010, p.5).  
 
The HK colonial government did not put emphasis on public policy research and did 
not set up any department with specialization in such area until the last decade prior to 
the 1997-handover. The policy advisory mechanism could be divided into three stages, 
which were “Prior to 1966”, “1966 to 1984” and “1984 to 1997 Handover” (Ma 1998, 
p.39-66).  
 
Prior to 1966 
As the British expatriates dominated most of the senior positions at the early stage of 
the colonial period, the Chinese had only minimal participation in the 
decision-making parties such as the LegCo and the Executive Council. The colonial 
government adopted a British style public engagement mechanism to gather public 
opinion before making final policy decisions. However, these engagement exercises 
only served a “cosmetic” function to enhance the public image of the government.  
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The Chinese community had low expectation on direct participation in the 
policy-making process. They would like to express their concern to voluntary 
organizations in the local community, such as Po Leung Kuk and Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals. These non-profit organizations and other merchant’s organizations formed 
an advisory network for the colonial government, but they could barely exercise any 
power in the policy-making process.  
 
1966 to 1984 
The first turning point came when the riots took place in 1966. The social value 
shifted from “utilitarian familism” suggested by Lau (1982, p.68) to a more 
westernized and modern mindset. Social unrest after the riot in 1966 aroused public 
interest in participating in the policy-making process and social reform.  
 
In order to respond to the pressure from the society, the colonial government carried 
out two major institutional changes. These were the establishment of City District 
Officers, and consultative boards and committees.  
 
The role of District Officer in the late 1960s was a “Political Officer” to understand 
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the problems and feeling of the society, and to communicate with people on policy 
implementation (HK Government 1968). The City District Officer Scheme was then 
expanded to District Boards for urban and rural districts, in which the members were 
appointed by the government. In the early 1980s, the boards were developed into a 
partially democratic setting in which parts of the members were elected by universal 
suffrage. The colonial government also set up advisory organizations since the late 
1960s. The government established 68 advisory organizations in 1967 (HK 
Government 1967) and the number of organizations was increased to 193 in 1983 
(HK Government 1983).   
 
The District Boards and advisory bodies formed a loose political community in HK. 
The development of District Boards released pressure from the society, and the 
advisory bodies strengthened the legitimacy for policy implementation. However, the 
colonial government tradition of top-down policy implementation approach was still 
being adopted. The Governor would only consult a few senior civil servants before 
implementing any new policies, and “on time” and “within budget” were two key 
principles of policy implementation (Scott 2010, p.9). The colonial government 
treated opposition from the society as obstacles in the implementation process. As 
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such, the set-up of District Boards and advisory bodies only retained the “cosmetic” 
function and was a strategy of “administrative absorption of politics” (Jin 1973, 
p.4)  – absorbing potential opposition in the society rather than coping with the 
challenge before the implementation stage.  
 
1984 to 1997 Handover 
China and Britain signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984. The 
anxiety between London and Beijing during the negotiation, and the uncertainties of 
the “transition” caused “confidence crisis” in the society. The June 4th incident in 
1989 worsened the “confidence crisis”. The society was apprehensive about the 
Chinese Communist Party and the change in sovereignty, and was worried that the 
British Government would sacrifice the interest of the HK people in the negotiation 
process so as to benefit her long-term relation with China. HK also faced economic 
transition since the late 1980s. The economy of HK had shifted from 
manufacturing-based to service-based, and the economic relationship with Southern 
China had to be strengthened (Central Policy Unit 1997, p.1). 
 
To maintain political credibility and social stability, the colonial government decided 
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to set up new communication channels to gather the views of China on various 
policies, so that the British Government could have a more effective negotiation with 
the Chinese Government before policies were implemented in HK. Apart from the 
advisory committees, the colonial government also gathered intelligence through the 
establishment of the CPU (Lau 2012, p.168) . The CPU served a political role to lobby 
support when new policies were implemented, and gathered political intelligence via 
members’ network in the society. Members of the CPU also provided advice and 
possible solutions to the Governor, the Chief Secretary (CS) and the Financial 
Secretary (FS) when facing new problems.  
 
The colonial government also appointed consultants to provide neutral and 
independent source of advice on various social issues during the transitional period, 
and to avoid “anti-Chinese” conspiracy in the fragile and sensitive relation between 
Britain and China.  
 
In the colonial period, the senior policymakers believed in keeping a small 
government and incremental change in policy-making. Bureaucrats were not 
responsive to social problems, and would only slightly adjust the existing policies and 
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implement new policy ideas solely based on departmental proposals. Also, the 
increase in the length of service and age of bureaucrats implied diminishing quality of 
innovation and creativity. The “Management by Generalist” model caused the leaders 
of policy branches and the Administrative Officers (AOs) to become distant from the 
professional field they were managing. The structure and functions of the CPU could 
fill the gaps that the bureaucracy could not combat. The transitional period after 1984 
was definitely a new challenge to bureaucrats, and their mindset and long tradition 
could not cater to the changes of constitutional development, sovereignty and 
economic transition, and social tension caused by these changes. In the meantime, 
China did not have strong opposition to the establishment of the CPU, since political 
“gu-wen” (adviser) were quite common in the Chinese political environment, and 
China could understand and accept the real function of the CPU. 
 
Period II: Tung Chee-hwa era (1997-2005) 
In July 1997, the sovereignty of HK was handed over to the Chinese Government and 
HK has since then become a special administrative region under the "One Country 
Two Systems" Principle. The structure of the government remained the same, with the 
Governor being replaced by the Chief Executive (CE), the first one being Tung 
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Chee-hwa (Tung). However, due to the dialogue breakdown between the British 
Government and the Chinese Government, not all government institutions received 
the "through-train" arrangement. For instance, the LegCo was replaced by the 
Provisional LegCo, and the CPU was another government institution which did not 
receive the "through-train" arrangement. (Provisional Legislative Council, HKSARG 
2007) 
 
Just before the handover, the CPU became non-existent as the tenure of all Part-time 
Members and Full-time Members was completed by December 1996 and January 
1997 resepectively. After the handover, in August 1997, Gordon Siu Kwing-chue 
(Gordon Siu), a civil servant, was appointed as the Head of CPU and Part-time 
Members were subsequently recruited into the CPU in late 1997.  By December 
1997, 35 Part-time Members were recruited. However, not all these 35 members were 
new faces. In fact, 14 of them, constituting a percentage of 40%, had served in the 
CPU before (List of CPU members at Appendix A). The posts of the three Full-time 
Members had, however, been left vacant for more than one year. It was not until 
mid-1998 that the CPU announced the appointment of Tsang Tak-sing 
(Beijing-funded Ta Kung Pao chief editor), John Bacon-Shone (Director of the HK 
The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong: A Study of Institutional Dynamics 
 
 
P.40  
 
 
University Social Sciences Research Centre) and Dr Lian Yizheng (HK Economic 
Journal chief editor) as Full-time Members, who took up their posts in July, August 
and September 1998 respectively (Cheung 1998). Together with the Full-time 
Members, 14 more Part-time Members were recruited at the end of 1998, making the 
total number up to 49.   
 
Shortly after the appointment of the three Full-time Members, in November 1998, 
Gordon Siu returned to the civil service and in February 1999, Mr Edgar Cheng 
Wai-kin (Edgar Cheng), the former Stock Exchange chairman, was appointed to head 
the CPU (The new line-up announced in Tung's third post-handover government 
reshuffle, South China Morning Post 1998).  In late 1999, when the two-year tenure 
of the first batch of post-handover Part-time Members finished, it was decided to 
greatly reduce the number of Part-time Members to 33 as it was opined that 
convening a meeting for nearly 50 members was not effective (CPU focuses on 
Democratic Party members and takes in members from the IT and tourism sector, 
Ming Pao 2000). The number of Part-time Members was then maintained at around 
30 to 40 till the end of the Tung era.  
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In July 2002, when Tung started his second term of office as CE, he appointed 
Professor Lau Siu-kai (Professor Lau) to be the head of the CPU to replace Edgar 
Cheng. Professor Lau was working in the Chinese University of HK before joining 
the CPU and was famous for openly criticizing the government often.  Deviating 
from the low-profile attitude of his predecessor, Edgar Cheng, Professor Lau acted as 
the spokesman for the government after taking up the role as the Head of CPU. 
(Without political representatives, the middle class does not have much influence, 
Hong Kong Economic Journal 2002)     
 
The post-handover days had not been easy for the HKSAR Government. Challenges 
and governance crisis experienced during the Tung era include the Asian financial 
crisis and the bird flu in 1997, the new airport fiasco in 1998, the short piles public 
housing scandal in 1999, the security law issue and the SARS epidemic in 2003. It 
was intended that the introduction of the POAS could strengthen executive leadership 
(Scott 2010, p.51) and that the appointment of Professor Lau to the CPU could help 
improve the image of Tung, to show that Tung was willing to listen to all views from 
the society, including opposing views (Hopes for new situation, Ming Pao 2002). 
However, neither the POAS nor Professor Lau could manage to come to Tung's rescue. 
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On 1 July 2003, 500,000 citizens took to the streets to protest against Article 23 and 
other administrative failures, which eventually led to the stepping-down of Tung in 
2005 before he finished his second term of office. In this incident, Professor Lau, as 
Head of CPU, also hit a great blow as he was heavily criticized for greatly 
underestimating the number of marchers at 30,000. (CPU a black box, spending over 
$40 million each year and not releasing information about its research, Sing Pao 
Daily News 2003) 
 
Period III: Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era (2005-2012)  
Donald Tsang Yam-kuen (Tsang) succeeded the position of the CE on 21 June 2005 
from Tung Chee-hwa, who stepped down early on 10 March 2005 citing health 
reasons caused by “long time hard-works” and for the “overall interests of the 
HKSAR and the nation” with his unfinished second term of office (Tung Chee-hwa 
resigns as HK chief executive, China Daily 2005). Tsang remained as the CE till the 
end of his tenure on 30 June 2012 which marks the third period (“Period III”) in 
CPU’s history. 
 
During Period III, CPU looked relatively stable than Period II with Professor Lau 
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continuing his position as the Head of CPU while his three “bosses”, i.e., the CE, the 
CS and the FS were mainly “old faces”. While Tsang was the former CS, the FS was 
Henry Tang Ying-yen who was later promoted to the post of CS and was succeeded 
by John Tsang Chun-wah in 2007 when Tsang began his second term of office. All of 
them remained in their positions throughout Period III. Rafael Hui Si-yan, the CS 
between 2005-07 when Tsang took up the remaining tenure of Tung, was ignored here 
for his relatively short period and transitional nature of service. Given this relatively 
stable composition, the parties ought to know the others well in terms of their working 
relationships and mutual expectations. 
 
The structure of CPU remained more or less the same as Period II, composing of the 
head and its deputy, three Full-time Members supported by a team of in-house 
researchers with all of them appointed under non-civil service terms on contract basis. 
The practice of appointing Part-time Members drawn from different sectors of the 
society to CPU continued though their number was raised to about 43 on average 
compared with that of about 35 during Period II based on the full-list of CPU 
membership obtained. (List of CPU members at Appendix A). For the three Full-time 
Members, Professor Lee Ming-kwan continued his office whereas Shiu Sin-por (the 
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incumbent head of CPU) replaced Tsang Tak-sing, who has been the Secretary for 
Home Affairs up to now. However, the appointment process of the third Full-time 
Member after Lian Yi-zheng left the CPU in September 2004 was not as “seamless” 
as the other two Full-time Members. It was not until 10 February 2006 when the 
HKSAR Government announced the appointment of Lau Sai-leung, who was an 
experienced commentator having connections with the mass media and 
pan-democratic camp. Quoting from the respective government press release, 
Professor Lau said he was extremely pleased with the wealth of media experience and 
background that Lau Sai-leung would bring to the CPU (news.gov.hk 2006). 
 
Another influential development of the policy advisory mechanism during Period III 
which brought about institutional changes over the positioning of CPU was the 
substantial expansion of the Commission on Strategic Development (CSD), as 
announced by Tsang in his first Policy Address of 2005-06. Period III was also 
characterised by the return of the AO-ruling class as Tsang, a veteran AO, acceded to 
the position of the CE. 
 
However, the action arena or contextual conditions surrounding CPU was not as 
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stable as its internal structure as just mentioned. The days of Period III were even 
more challenging for the HKSAR Government. Although the people’s level of 
satisfaction with the HKSAR Government, measured by the Public Opinion 
Programme of the University of HK, did rise sharply from around 20% when Tung 
Chee-hwa resigned in March 2005 to its double within the next year and maintained 
roughly between 40% to 50% up to mid-2008, the figures dropped quite rapidly to 
between 30% to 20% towards the end of Tsang’s tenure. (Public Opinion Programme, 
The University of Hong Kong 2014) 
 
Economically, while HK was still recovering from the worst ever condition since the 
handover as a result of the outbreak of SARS epidemic in 2003, the global financial 
tsunami dragged the city into another round of economic downturn from 2008 to 2009. 
More fundamentally, HK lost its competitiveness and direction of development in the 
globalised economy. This “Pearl of the Orient” had lost its luster in the eyes of the 
people from Mainland China who commanded rising and much stronger economic 
power than Hongkongers. Due to the widening gap between the rich and the poor, 
social immobility and value conflicts between generations of the society, the 
Hongkongers were getting frustrated and divided among themselves. 
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On the political side, the “Quad-Fragmentation” of the local political system in the 
post 1997-era, i.e., the fragmentation between the executive and the legislature, their 
alliances, the civil servants, and the society, contributed to the governance failure of 
the HK Government since the handover (Lau 2011, p.9). The procrastination of 
constitutional development on democratising the CE and the LegCo elections 
processes during Tsang’s era even aggravated the political condition whereas the 
further expansion of the POAS by Tsang in 2007-08 failed to cater for the growing 
diversified or even polarised societal interests. 
 
The governance challenges faced by the Tsang’s government were increasingly tough 
against the backdrop of a rising civil society marked by the mass demonstration on 1 
July 2003, followed by a series of social movements of different scales that broke out 
in Period III. The more significant ones included the opposition to the removal of Star 
Ferry clock tower in 2006, the redevelopment project of Lee Tung Street in Wanchai 
in 2007, the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–HK Express Rail Link project in 2009, and those 
judicial review cases connected with reclamation within the Victoria Harbour in 2003, 
the initial public offering of the Link REIT in 2005, the removal of the Queen’s Pier 
in 2007 and the environmental impact assessment for the HK-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge 
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Project in 2011. Lau (2011, p.6) highlighted that those movements among the 
“activated” social masses not only reflected the pursuit of the post-materialistic values 
of the younger generations of HK, being “tagged” as the “post-80’s or post-90’s”, but 
also the actualisation of their own identities that were different from their parents of 
the older generations who are still in power. In a nutshell, the society as a whole was 
becoming more unstable, fragmented and politcised during Period III. 
 
Period IV: Leung Chun-ying era (2012-Present) 
The period from 13 July 2012 to the present marks the fourth period in CPU’s history. 
Although Professor Lau and his team of Full-time Members left the unit after 
completion of tenure on 30 June 2012, the head position was not filled until 13 July 
2012 when the three Full-time Members positions were still vacant. As many 
speculated, CE Leung Chun-ying (Leung) appointed Mr Shiu Sin-por (Shiu) to lead 
the Government’s think tank. Shiu has been one of the unit’s Full-time Member since 
2007. He is known for his pro-Beijing political stance and his close ties with Leung 
(“King of the Leftists” Shiu Sin-por heads the CPU, Ming Pao 2012) Prior to joining 
the unit, he was the Executive Director of the One Country Two Systems Research 
Institute where Leung is a former chairman, board of directors. He also served as the 
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Deputy Secretary General of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law of the 
HKSAR of the People's Republic of China from 1985 to 1990, and as Member and 
Deputy Secretary General of the Preparatory Committee for the HKSAR from 1996 to 
1997. He is a member of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (Central Policy Unit 2012).  
 
As a government think tank responsible for conducting policy research, the CPU 
should supposedly be headed by Full-time Members with substantial policy research 
experience who can take charge of various studies and research projects. However, 
except Professor Wong Chack-kie who is an experienced social and public policy 
researcher, the suitability of the other Full-time Members to fill the posts were put 
into question. Ms Sophia Kao Ching-chi is specialized in human resources 
management with no relevant policy research experience. The Government justified 
her appointment by pointing out the importance of cultivating and building up a 
reserve of talents in support of HK’s future development, and this position would help 
enhance the management of the talents reserve (Administration Wing, HKSARG 
2013). Mr Kwan Wing-kei served as a Full-time Member at the CPU temporarily 
from 3 October 2012 to 31 March 2013. As a professional in the publishing industry, 
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he was also criticized for possessing no relevant policy research experience (Yu 2012). 
In November 2012, Shiu proposed to the Panel on Public Service the creation of a 
non-civil service position of Full-time Member (4) in the CPU, who would provide 
advisory service in respect of the new media and public opinions (Panel on Public 
Service, LegCo 2012). Although the CPU eventually withdrew this staffing proposal 
due to overall objection from legislative councillors, its appointments were 
overshadowed by accusations of favoritism.  
  
Other than the unconventional selection of Full-time Members, CPU nowadays has 
new responsibilities in the areas of managing talents reserve and collecting public 
opinions. In a television programme, Shiu remarked that CPU was a government tool 
and it would launch public opinion campaigns to lobby for public support for 
government policies (Panel on Public Service, LegCo 2012).  A number of 
legislative councillors considered these to be an expansion of CPU’s functions and the 
CPU has deviated its main role as a think tank to provide advice on long-term policies. 
The legislative councillors also expressed grave concerns that such a new work 
approach would politicize the society and turn CPU into a “propaganda department” 
of the Government (Panel on Public Service, LegCo 2012). 
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According to Professor Lau, the former Head of CPU, the CPU used to be more 
focused on conducting policy research and advising the Government on policy issues 
behind the scenes (RTHK 2014). As the CPU under Leung’s administration came 
increasingly under spotlight, the relationship between the Government or the CPU and 
other sectors of the society has become worsened. In particular, the CPU went into 
conflict with the academic sector as it took over the administration of the Public 
Policy Research Funding Scheme since 2013-2014 without consulting the LegCo or 
the RGC. Worried about the interference with academic freedom, students and 
scholars from the eight universities protested against the Government’s plan. Even 
though the RGC indicated its intention to continue with its function in approving 
research projects, and an alternative proposal was suggested in a LegCo Panel 
meeting, the Government insisted to let CPU revise the Scheme’s operation 
(Administration Wing, HKSARG 2013b). As a result, the CPU began to administer 
the Scheme, including the identification of research areas and topics, invitation of 
applications, assessment, and monitoring. It is reported that after Shiu came to office, 
the CPU has awarded four out of 11 funded consultancy studies to the pro-Beijing 
One Country Two Systems Research Institute (Chong 2014) which Shiu used to head. 
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In less than two years’ time, the CPU seems to have expanded its functions beyond 
the original think tank of the Government. In addition to advising the CE, CS and FS 
on various policy issues and conducting research, it now collects and monitors public 
opinion, oversees appointments to government advisory bodies through a Full-time 
Member, and resumes control of public policy research funding. While these changes 
indicate the unit’s increase of power in a short period of time, they also imply more 
challenges for CPU from inside and outside of the Government. 
 
Concluding comments 
The CPU, since its formation in 1989, has seen changes of sovereignty from the 
British Government to the Chinese Government. After the handover, it has also served 
three CEs.       
 
Throughout its 25 years of history, the institutional structure of the CPU has remained 
relatively simple. It is led by a head together with three to four Full-time Members 
and a team of Part-time Members. The only changes observed in the institutional 
structure was the increase in the number of Part-time Members from under 20 in the 
pre-1997 era to over 40 under Tsang's era.     
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The most significant change observed in the CPU was its roles and functions. In the 
early days, the political environment was relatively simple, with the British 
government targeting to maintain political stability and maximize benefits to them.  
Opposing views were mainly dealt with by "administrative adsorption".  
Nevertheless, in the days near to the handover, the colonial rule faced "confidence 
crisis" and also the challenges of the change of economy from manufacturing-based to 
service-based. Under this circumstance, the CPU was set up to deal with the crises 
and challenges mainly by providing outsiders' advice and expertise to complement the 
management by generalists, that is, the AOs.   
 
After the handover, various challenges and governance crises, such as the Asian 
financial crisis and the bird flu in 1997, continued to hit the HKSAR Government.  
The popularity of the CE, Tung, had plummeted. To help strengthen the executive rule, 
Tung decided to set up the POAS in 2002 for policy advice and positioned the head of 
the CPU, Professor Lau, as spokesman of the government. Besides doing policy 
research, the CPU had shifted focus to conducting polling in order to help the CE 
gather information about public sentiment.  
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Nevertheless, the CPU did not come to the rescue of Tung who eventually stepped 
down before finishing his second term of office. His successor, Tsang, a veteran AO, 
put more trust on the civil servants and brought back the old days of "rule by AOs".  
The CPU was further sidelined by the expansion of the POAS and CSD. Although 
Tsang enjoyed an honeymoon period of high popularity in the first couple of years, 
the rise of civic society, the demand for more participation in policy-setting and the 
unstable, fragmented and politcised society posed headaches for Tsang. Under such 
setting, the CPU, though spending millions of dollars on research each year, seems 
unable to offer good advice or solutions to the HKSAR Government. 
 
Leung, being very different from Tsang, decided to expand the roles and functions of 
the CPU. On top of doing policy research, the CPU is now given the power to oversee 
appointments to government advisory bodies and control public policy research 
funding. It has also been given the mission to lobby for public support for government 
policies through public opinion campaigns. 
 
To sum up, despite the CPU has not experienced rigorous changes in its institutional 
structures, its roles and functions have experienced various permutations, from 
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offering outside expertise in the pre-1997 era, to being spokesman for Tung, and 
subsequently being sidelined by Tsang and finally being empowered by Leung to 
control policy research funding. It is obvious that the roles and functions of the CPU 
depend on its "bosses" to a very large extent.  
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   Chapter Four 
The Central Policy Unit: Institutional Foundations and Maturity 
 
Introduction 
Having addressed the institutional structures and changes of the CPU in Chapter 
Three, this chapter examines the institutional foundations and maturity of the CPU as 
guided and informed by the analytical framework devised in Chapter Two.  The four 
periods described in Chapter Three, namely the pre-1997 era, the Tung Chee-hwa era, 
the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era and the Leung Chun-ying era, are analyzed using 
Ostrom's seven rules-in-use, including boundary rules, position rules, authority rules, 
scope rules, aggregation rules, information rules and payoff rules. The analysis leads 
to an assessment of the institutional maturity of the CPU over the four periods.  
 
Period I: Pre-1997 era  
HK entered a turbulent stage after Britain and China started to negotiate about the 
sovereignty problem in 1982, and after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed 
in 1984. In order to tackle the foreseeable crisis in economy, constitutional 
development and social stability in the transitional period, the colonial government 
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decided to set up the CPU in 1988 which was “tailored for the HK Government” (Yue 
1992) so that the government could have practical and imaginative advice for its 
long-term policy planning before the 1997-handover.  
 
Boundary Rules 
The boundary rules specify whether the participants “enter freely, and the conditions 
they face for leaving” (Ostrom 1999, p.52). With reference to the boundary rules, 
participants enter the CPU by appointment, and exit by retirement, resignation and 
completion of tenure. 
 
After deciding the scope of the CPU, Lord Wilson, the then Governor, invited Leo 
Goodstadt to be the Head of CPU in 1988 in view of his diverse background. As 
Goodstadt was neither an AO nor a civil servant, his appointment broke the long 
tradition of the colonial government structure. Goodstadt was a scholar specializing in 
economics and political trends in Asia and China, and was a consultant economist 
who provided consulting service to various corporations in the Far East from the late 
1970s to 1989 prior to joining the CPU. He was also a senior journalist specializing in 
economic and political issues from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. He served “Far 
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Eastern Economic Review”, London “Times” and “Euromoney”, British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and Asia Television Limited (ATV) (leofgoodstadt.com 2014) in 
that period.  
 
Position Rules 
Position rules are understood as the positions established in an action situation 
(Ostrom 1999, p.52). The CPU was a small scale think tank which consisted of 4 to 5 
Full-time Members and 18 Part-time Members. The Full-time Members were mainly 
civil servants, economists, and political scientists seconded from the private sector 
such as the Swire Group and Hang Seng Bank. Among the 18 Part-time Members, 
approximately 50% of them were from the business field, whereas approximately 
25% were from the legal profession and the rest 25% were from the academic sector 
(Yue 1992). They usually served the CPU for 1 to 2 years, and some of them served 
the Unit for a maximum of 30 months if the member’s expertise was in need. The 
offer of short-term contracts facilitated creative ideas since members would not worry 
about whether their career prospects would be affected in the long run. 
 
Members of the CPU in this period were the “elite”, especially the “economic elite” 
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of HK. They tended to have postgraduate qualifications and successful careers with 
involvement in public affairs. The Part-time Members could keep the CPU in contact 
with the reality of HK with their social, economic and political sentiment.  
 
In 1991, the CPU formed a network and invited former Part-time Members to give 
their opinion. This network could extend the support from social elite. The CPU also 
formed two “Community Panel” in May 1991 (Yue 1992). The panels not only 
consisted of leaders of pressure groups in HK, but also the representatives of middle 
class, the silent majority in the society. Diversity of members was a definite advantage 
to consolidate comprehensive information from the society. 
 
Authority Rules 
The CPU was completely separated from policy implementation, and its authority and 
executive power were based on the acceptance of proposal and the annual Policy 
Address. To find out the acceptance of its proposals, the Unit developed a mechanism 
to check the CS’s office on the degree of implementation one month after the proposal 
was submitted, and the record would only be cancelled if the report was implemented. 
Up to 1992, the Unit submitted 400 reports with only 0.5% being rejected (Yue 1992). 
The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong: A Study of Institutional Dynamics 
 
 
P.59  
 
 
It could be interpreted that the senior policy makers and the CPU enjoyed a trusted 
relationship, and the CPU actually had a “behind-the-scene” executive power in 
setting the policy agenda.  
 
CPU was an individual policy branch attached to top policy makers and distanced 
from the government daily operation. However, it could monitor the public sentiment 
on government performance and had the mandate to study the policy areas under 
other policy branches. CPU in fact enjoyed a higher authority status than other policy 
branches. 
 
Scope Rules 
The drafting of Policy Address is known to be a major task of the CPU. It was 
originally a task of the CS to receive policy branches’ proposed projects for the 
coming year, but they usually lacked political and social sensitivity in preparing the 
projects. The mechanism of drafting the Policy Address was changed in 1989 and had 
become a political task after it was delegated to the CPU. In the 1989 Policy Address, 
the goal was to rebuild community’s confidence in HK, therefore the New Airport 
Development Strategy was introduced. Another example happened in 1992, before the 
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arrival of the new Governor, Lord Patten. CS David Ford would like to collect a wide 
range of social policy initiatives within a short period of time to serve as the 
foundation of colonial government in the coming 5 years. The policy branches refused 
to submit policy proposal, abandoning the traditional policy process. Finally, David 
Ford assigned the authority to CPU to design an inter-departmental and a huge scale 
socio-economic policy, which was announced in the 1992 Policy Address “Our Next 
Five Years: The Agenda for Hong Kong” (Ma 1998).   
 
Another major task of CPU was to provide crisis analysis to the policymakers. The 
CPU provided exclusive and confidential service for 3 clients: the Governor, the CS, 
and the FS. The Unit would study the projects suggested by these three policymakers. 
Different positions in the CPU would work on social, political and economic 
problems that the existing colonial government did not have the expertise and 
resources to deal with. The Unit was expected to provide comprehensive studies and 
creative solutions to problems that the government encountered, and it was shown that 
the position of CPU might affect the scope of the Unit.  
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Sir Piers Jacobs, the former FS, expressed his concern when the Governor, Lord 
Wilson, decided to establish the CPU. Sir Jacobs was worried that the Governor and 
the CS would adopt CPU’s suggestion against him and his Financial Branch when the 
social and political issue was controversial to economic and financial benefits. Finally 
the CPU agreed that the Unit would not undertake any public role on behalf of the 
Government so as to prevent any possible worries (Ma 1998). 
 
Right after the CPU was formed in 1989, the June 4th incident happened. The CPU 
had a new mission to facilitate policymakers to tackle ad hoc political crisis, to collect 
intelligence, to give instant response to maintain dialogue with the Chinese 
Government through members’ network, and to forecast the possible difficulties in 
future before the 1997 handover. 
 
It was believed that the CPU was also responsible for identifying political elites who 
believed in western values, and nurtured them to become political leaders before the 
handover. The British government expected these leaders to influence the HKSAR 
Government after handover so that “One Country Two System” could be implemented 
as per the British government’s expectation (Lau 2012). 
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Aggregation Rules 
Aggregating public opinions into collective decisions was not the scope of CPU under 
Goodstadt’s leadership, and information in this period was mainly based on the 
judgment and personal network of CPU members. A few panels had been set up to 
aggregate views from public; however, these panels were mainly representing 
business sector, middle class, and political groups, and the impact of their views 
towards CPU final reports and recommendations were unclear.  
 
The public generally accept this mechanism of aggregating public ideas, since 
economic and financial benefits were the top concern among the society, and the 
expectation of participating policy process was low at that time. 
 
Information Rules 
The CPU enjoyed a higher authority then other policy branches, and was against 
publishing any recommendation the unit produced, since publications would break the 
trust with her clients. Goodstadt remained reticent about CPU projects even when he 
attended a LegCo Financial Committee Meeting in 1990 for the approval of annual 
funding (Yue 1992). However, the Unit paid effort to build up public image via having 
The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong: A Study of Institutional Dynamics 
 
 
P.63  
 
 
interviews and giving information to media.  
 
For internal communications of CPU, members’ personal connection with Chinese 
and HK officials, businessmen, civil servants and academics formed a high quality, 
informal and confidential information network. As mentioned in the Position Rules, 
these networks enable the unit to have high quality expert advice and sensitive 
information, and facilitate the unit to produce analysis on crisis quickly.  
 
Part-time Members met on alternate Saturdays, and meeting was chaired by the head 
of CPU. Meetings were well organized, reference materials and papers were issued to 
members one week prior to the meeting, and usually 2-3 issues were discussed in each 
meeting. The frequent and regular communication channel acted like a brain-storming 
session, and facilitated CPU to make quick response to social issue and public 
sentiment.  
 
In 1991-1992, CPU strengthened the information network of CPU former Part-time 
Members via coordinating regular meeting every 6 months, and later, meeting every 3 
months. These structured discussion provided extra source of expertise to existing 
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CPU members.  
 
CPU aggregated public opinion via meeting selected representatives. Two 
“Community panels” representing leading pressure groups and middle class had 
monthly meeting with CPU members, and panel members would share their views on 
social topics with CPU members. However, panel members did not know the impact 
of their ideas, and information channel between panels and CPU was “one way 
traffic” (Yue 1992). Ideas from panel members would only be circulated to Deputy 
Heads of CPU for internal reference.  
 
CPU submitted “Research Reports” and “Information Reports” to policy makers in 
clear and concise format in order to gain attention. Reports covered facts and 
recommendation of particular issue, and reports were checked by at least one person, 
and preferably two to three people to ensure accuracy and consistency. 
 
Payoff Rules 
For Payoff Rules, funding of the CPU comes solely from the government. However, 
the Unit was also subsidized by private sector in term of providing free expertise, 
intelligence, networks and professional advices. Big Corporation treated temporary 
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transfer of staff as information exchange in order to maintain a close ties with 
government under the unstable political condition before 1997 handover.  
 
Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity 
In the pre-1997 era, the colonial government believed in “governance by elitism”, and 
appointed elites from diverse background as members of CPU. The CPU had a trusted 
relationship with the Governor, the CS, and the FS, and enjoyed a higher authority 
than other policy branches. CPU was assigned various scope of important secret 
mission like studying the feasibility of inter-departmental policy and key political 
issue like 1997 handover and June 4th incident. Confidential information networks 
formed by members were the key information channel of CPU, and aggregating 
public views was not the major scope of work of CPU. However, the CPU was 
well-received by the public since Goodstadt paid efforts to build up CPU’s public 
image through media. People generally believed that the economic and financial 
benefits in Hong Kong were the result of “governance by elitism”, and the need of 
participating policy process was low in the society. 
 
As an existing governmental institution, CPU can at least achieve Level 1 maturity.  
As Level 1 maturity only requires an institution to have “legal structural 
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characteristics” and that “the main aim is to create appropriate institutions and to 
ensure the retention and enhancement” (Thynne 2012) in which its structure, tasks 
allocations and also task competencies are formed. CPU, from its first inception 
during the colonial era to the current government, the government offered CPU one of 
the main tasks is to advising policy address. There was no change on the core function 
of CPU under the legal status of the institution.  
 
During this period, structure, power, interaction and ethics were quite clear. The 
membership of CPU was composed of elites from the society. Obviously, the structure 
was linked with the scope of CPU that it was to work on the problems that the rest of 
the government had no expertise and could only work on a project that was agreed by 
the three clients. The head of CPU could create collaborative relations with the three 
clients. Information flow within the CPU was flat internal decision making structure 
which made trust and support between the head and the research staff. During Period I, 
it is concluded that CPU can achieve Level 2 maturity. 
 
Period II: Tung Chee-hwa era (1997-2005) 
During the handover in 1997, similar to the LegCo, the CPU did not get the 
"through-train" arrangement, meaning that all members had to "get off the train" 
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before the handover and a new batch of members were appointed to "get on the train" 
after the handover.  Not only have the members have changed, but the role and the 
function of the CPU have also become very different from the pre-1997 era.  
 
Boundary Rules 
For the Boundary Rules, similar to the pre-1997 era, people enter the CPU by 
appointment, and exit by retirement, resignation and completion of tenure.   
 
Three people have acted as the head of the CPU during the Tung era, firstly Gordon 
Siu, Edgar Cheng and finally Professor Lau.  Gordon Siu was actually a civil servant 
and appointment of him as head of CPU deviates from the practice of the 
pre-handover period when the head of the CPU came from outside the government.  
Advice given by the CPU may thus be very similar to those given by the civil servants 
in the bureaux and departments.  2.5 years later, in early 1999, Edgar Cheung, 
coming from the financial sector outside the government, replaced Gordon Siu as 
head of CPU and this represented a return to the unit's origin as an alternative source 
of advice to that provided by the civil service and lots of finance-related research has 
been carried out during this time.  Then, in 2002, Professor Lau who came from the 
academic sector was appointed in 2002, which was seen as a move to strengthen the 
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academic support for the research by the CPU.  From the above, it is clearly observe 
that the appointment of the head of the CPU significantly affects its scope.   
 
Position Rules 
Similar to the pre-1997 era, the CPU consisted of Full-time and Part-time Members.  
Shortly after the handover, in end 1997, there were 35 Part-time Members in the CPU, 
which is already double of that in the pre-handover days.  The number rose to 49 in 
end 1998.  However, in early 2000, the number of Part-time Members was reduced 
back to 33 as they found it difficult to arrange meetings for such a big group.  (CPU 
focuses on Democratic Party members and takes in members from the IT and tourism 
sector 2000) 
 
In the pre-handover period, many of the members came from the business sector and 
were viewed as the 'elites', possessing the talent to offer advice to the government for 
the benefit of HK.  However, after the handover, with the rise of the civic society, 
this 'elite' system was not working as well as it used to be.  To cope with this change, 
people from different sectors of the society, including the academics sector, the social 
welfare sector, the political sector, and so on, were recruited into the CPU and its 
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composition has become more diversified.  For instance, following the appointment 
of Professor Lau as head of CPU in 2002, many professors from the academics sector 
were appointed as Part-time Members as well.  This showed a certain degree of shift 
from "governance by elitism" to "governance by network".    
 
The diversification of the CPU members has facilitated the setting up of 
multifariousness panels under this era, including the Pan Pearl River Delta panel, 
social cohesion panel, Basic Law Article 23 panel, and so on.  It has also resulted in 
diversification of the scope of the research, ranging from economic topics to social 
topics, such as housing, poverty, children, young people, elderly, families, art and 
culture, environment, education, health care, third sector, and so on. (List of research 
projects at Appendix B)   
 
Authority Rules 
Similar to the pre-1997 era, the CPU did not any explicit authority.  Its influence 
depended really on whether the CE was willing to listen to the advice from the CPU, 
including its head and members.  It is clear that the ones who take up different 
positions in the CPU and their relationship with CE would affect its authority.   
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The appointment of Professor Lau into the CPU was seen as a gesture by Tung to 
show to the public that he was willing to listen to the views of the public, in particular 
opposing views.  Nevertheless, it seemed that Tung was never whole-hearted in 
listening to the views of Professor Lau and other members of the CPU and there was a 
lack of trust between them.  In fact, in September 2003, just about one year after he 
took up the post of the head of the CPU, Professor Lau has openly said that he would 
like to go back to the Chinese University (Lau Siu-kai: It is about time to return to the 
Chinese University, Hong Kong Economic Journal 2003). In January 2003, Professor 
Lau has also written to the those who has been consulted regarding the Policy Address, 
to thank them and at the same time inform that that their opinion and advice has not 
been adopted in the Policy Address (Lee 2003).  This clearly demonstrated that the 
authority of the CPU was really weak.  The role and importance of the CPU further 
diminished after the implementation of the POAS in 2002, because the CE could rely 
on the Principal Officials instead of the CPU for policy advice.  Indeed, it was the 
policy bureaux who got the authority for deciding the direction of the policies and its 
implementation, but not the CPU.   
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Scope Rules 
Drafting the Policy address still remained as a main task of CPU.  However, 
Professor Lau added the following to the task list of the CPU: 
(1) Helping the CE obtain information about the political situation and public 
sentiment; 
(2) Providing the government with long term viewpoint as policy reference; 
(3) Strengthening its capabilities in respect of conducting surveys and analysis on 
public opinion; and 
(4) Fostering academic support for policies.  
(Lau Siu-kai took up the role as Head of CPU and challenged members with four 
missions, Wen Wai Po 2002) These tasks seem to be a bit different from the Leo 
Goodstadt’s days when the CPU was taking up tasks that no bureaux and departments 
wanted to take up.   
 
Professor Lau worked very hard on these four aspects.  During that period, the CPU 
carried out 70 polls each year (Ng 2004), which means more than one poll per week.  
Topics of the polling were of a wide variety, ranging from prevention of avian flu, 
Victoria Harbour reclamation, Harbour Fest, constitutional development, etc and the 
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government admitted that the CPU would carry out opinion surveys of any topics 
which was of interest to the public (news.gov.hk 2004).  In fact, he carried out so 
many opinion polls that some people called the CPU as the “Central Polling Unit” 
(Fan 2003).  Professor Lau also took up the job of spokesman for the government.  
He frequently appeared in front of the media, defending government policies in front 
of the media and some people called the CPU as “Central PR Unit” (Fan 2003).  
Some people also called the CPU as the "Counting People Unit" (Yu 2004), as CPU 
somehow took up the role of estimating the number of people turning up in the 
protests.   
 
On the other hand, though the number of polls carried out by the CPU under this era 
has increased, the number of public forums organized by the CPU has decreased.  In 
1998 and 1999, 10 public forums were organized each year, but in the year 2000 to 
2003, the number has been greatly reduced to around 3 each year. (Eu 2005)  It 
seemed that that method of aggregation of public opinions has shifted from open 
discussion in the front stage to doing secret polling in the back stage.    
 
 
The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong: A Study of Institutional Dynamics 
 
 
P.73  
 
 
Aggregation Rules 
Aggregating public opinion into collective decisions had been the main focus and 
scope of Professor Lau. Under his leadership, the CPU carried out lots of polls and 
Professor Lau often met with people from different sectors of the society to listen to 
their opinions. The composition of the CPU members had also been diversified to 
include people from different background. Nevertheless, Tung's policies did not seem 
to be able to satisfy public sentiments. As the matters discussed within the CPU were 
kept confidential, as described under the Information Rules, it was not sure whether 
CPU failed in its role of aggregating public opinion or that Tung failed to listen to the 
CPU.       
 
Information Rules 
Similar to the pre-handover period, the CPU was still a “black box”.  Professor Lau 
had openly refused to release the results of the polling that CPU conducted, using the 
excuse that “it will arouse unnecessary public speculation about governance and 
direction of Government policy." (news.gov.hk 2004). Nevertheless, starting from 
2000, CPU had selectively put some of its research reports on its website despite 
many of the reports were still kept confidential. The confidentiality of CPU had not 
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only made research of its institutional foundation difficult, but it had also made 
members who took up positions in the CPU unhappy, as they did not know whether 
their advice had been listened to or not. The society was also unhappy about the 
confidentiality of the CPU and legislative councillors frequently challenged the payoff 
of public money for such a secret mission.      
 
Payoff Rules 
Similar to the pre-1997 era, funding of the CPU came solely from the government.  
Those who joined the CPU were not simply awarded in monetary terms, but they also 
received the benefit of getting access to insiders' information. They also enjoyed a 
higher social status of being closer to the core of the HK government. However, as 
described under the Information Rules, as the CPU was still a “black box”, it was 
difficult to find solid proof of the payoff of the CPU members.   
 
Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity 
Although the CPU in Period II remained as a “black box” and information about it 
was still kept highly confidential, the institutional foundations of the CPU had 
changed a lot. Its members in different positions had diversified background, showing 
a shift from "governance by elitism" to "governance by network". Rather than doing 
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secret missions as assigned, the CPU began to focus on polling and aggregating public 
opinions. The change of the CPU echoed the change in the political environment 
characterized by the rise of the civic society. However, despite the changes of CPU 
which went along with the trend in society, the CPU was not well-received by the 
public as its authority was very weak and depended on the relationship with the CE. 
Tung did not put much emphasis on the CPU and he even set up the POAS for policy 
advice in 2002. The CPU was thus left aside and its advice left unattended.      
 
Given the above analysis, the concern here was whether the CPU can achieve Level 2 
or even Level 3 maturity during this period. The four elements, i.e. the structure, 
power, interaction and ethics had been constructed for CPU to achieve Level 1 
maturity at least. However, due to the change of “boundary” of CPU, it affected the 
interdependency and linkage of the four elements. With the appointment of Professor 
Lau as the head of CPU, and the appointment of Tung, a businessman as CE, the 
dynamics between Lau and Tung affected the main function of CPU. The lack of trust 
between them led to the absence of adoption of CPU’s opinion into the Policy Address, 
and it diminished the relationship between the head of CPU and the CE. Another clue 
explaining the ineffectiveness of the CPU was the new political arena. The expansion 
of POAS positioned CPU as the non-agent for deciding policy direction. The 
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authority of CPU was trimmed down and the scope of CPU was changed during 
Tung’s administration. All of the above could not accommodate a healthy interaction 
between Professor Lau and Tung. 
 
With the academic background of Professor Lau, CPU was strong at conducting 
polling to help CE get information about the political situation and public sentiment in 
the society with the nickname of “Central Polling Unit”, “Central PR Unit” and 
“Counting People Unit”. However, how much research and advice the CPU had 
provided to the three clients was unknown as there was no direct clue to investigate 
how the research and the policy implementation were linked to each other. It was hard 
to see the direct role of CPU with the three clients. The CPU entity could only give 
people an impression that it only worked on polling without substantial contribution 
on policy advice in which the power was narrowed down, and the interaction with 
other bodies was not clear. 
 
In addition, most of the research data and polling were kept secret internally, making 
the public unable to access the information. This should be one of the easier ethical 
standards to be fulfilled. In summary, during this period, what CPU could do or could 
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not do was controlled by the CE. There was no alignment between the power of CPU 
should have and the people that CPU should serve. CPU could not function as a real 
think tank during this period and it could not achieve Level 2 maturity. It only 
regressed to an “orderly shell”. 
 
Period III: Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era (2005-2012)  
As highlighted in the previous Chapter, the HK society during Period III was tensed 
up by the growing diversified societal interests that the fragmented political system 
failed to cater to, which in turns brought new economic, social and political 
challenges for Tsang’s government particularly on restoring the governance 
confidence that was hampered by the sudden step-down of Tung in Period II. In this 
regard, the need for high quality policy advice in a timely manner should thus be 
imminent for the government and CPU as its own think tank ought to play a key role 
under such dynamic and volatile environment.  
 
Boundary Rules 
Given the sudden step down of Tung in the mid of his tenure, it was reasonable that 
Tsang ought to keep the resulting impacts minimal during his first two years of 
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service after taking up the remaining term of office from Tung. Assuming that Tsang 
followed this line of thought, the continuation of Professor Lau as the head of CPU 
would not be a surprise as they were not new to each other. By the same token, the 
“seamless” replacement of Tsang Tak-sing by Shiu was not surprising for their same 
pro-Beijing background and obviously to maintain the connections with the 
pro-establishment camp. The later appointment of Lau Sai-leung to CPU would be a 
clue to the deviation of the traditional role of CPU in producing policy advice and a 
piece of evidence of how Tsang stretched the boundary of CPU to accommodate the 
talent he needed without being hindered by the rigid appointment process of civil 
servant, since Full-time Members of CPU were not employed on civil service 
conditions and accordingly need not be bounded by the Civil Service Regulation and 
Code of Conduct. 
 
Lau Sai-leung was an experienced commentator, former consulting chief editor of 
Tom Group, Cup’s Publishing chief executive officer, a member and executive 
director of the Democratic Party and believed of having affiliations with Martin Lee 
Chu-ming, the ‘Father of Hong Kong Democracy” (Liu 2008) and the founding 
chairman of the Democratic Party, and Albert Cheng Jing-han, also widely known as 
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“Tai-Pan”, “Chief Executive before 10am”, who was the host of the popular radio talk 
show ‘Teacup in a Storm” and an elected LegCo Member from September 2004 to 
September 2008. Around the same time of Lau Sai-leung’s appointment, Tsang also 
appointed Andy Ho On-tat as the CE’s office information coordinator. Cheng (2006) 
commented that their appointments had reflected the importance of public relations in 
the eyes of Tsang who vowed “strong” governance in his first Policy Address of 
2005-06 themed “Strong Governance for the People”. Rather than focusing on the 
policy itself, it seemed to Cheng that Tsang just wished to win public opinion to 
suppress the voices of opposition, but at the same time acknowledged that his fellow 
AO ruling class might not have a good enough feeling for the community’s pulse. He 
went on to alert that “spin” alone would not solve the basic problem but make it 
neglected. While it was important to present government’s position to its citizens in a 
persuasive manner, it was considered more important for the administration to 
demonstrate its sincerity in listening to the citizens in a non-selective manner. Tsang’s 
appointments of his own spin doctors also meant silencing Professor Lau who used to 
be the spokesman for government on his own account during Period II. The shifting 
of focus from policy research to policy “marketing” could also partly explain the 
increase of publication of research reports and seminars held as the observable 
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outcomes of CPU during Period III under the Scope Rules below. 
 
Last but not least, the boundary or more specifically the appointment for or exit of 
CPU’s members, no matter for Full-time and Part-time ones, remained under the full 
control of the bosses of CPU and were kept opaque without giving any explanation to 
the LegCo, not to mention the press or the general public. 
 
Position Rules 
The size of CPU’s part-time membership was in general larger than that in Period II 
which was increased from 39 in 2005 and 2006 to 51 in 2007. The figures dropped to 
about 40 between 2008 and 2011 but rose up to 46 in 2012 (List of CPU members at 
Appendix A). The backgrounds were as diversified as in Period II with members 
drawing from different sectors of the society. 
 
In his first Policy Address of 2005-06, Tsang announced that he would substantially 
expand the membership of CSD by inviting talent from different fields to join and 
look upon it as the most important advisory body (HKSARG 2005a). Around a month 
later, he appointed 153 non-official members to the CSD drawing from a broad cross 
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section of the community comprising mainly professionals, academics, businessmen, 
politicians, prominent labour and media personalities, indicating that he was pleased 
to know a wide spectrum of prominent people and experts had accepted his invitation 
and agreed to contribute their time and efforts to the Commission (HKSARG 2005b). 
Comparing the CSD’s official terms of reference (HKSARG 2005c) with the claimed 
works of the CPU, it seemed that the setting-up of the CSD was of a higher profile, 
more strategic and embracing than that of the CPU and it provided advice to the CE 
only. This more prominent standing of the much expanded CSD had exerted side 
effects over CPU’s membership composition which had been downgraded in terms of 
their members’ political, academic and economic standings. The reason behind was 
that while a few CPU members were being “promoted” to the more prominent 
platform of CSD, it would obviously be more difficult to refill the vacancies by 
equally “qualified” ones bearing in mind that the unwieldy CSD had already 
“absorbed’ those “prominent people and experts” as Tsang referred while the number 
of CPU’s Part-time Members were also increased during Period III.  
 
No matter for CSD and CPU, their expansion of memberships by Tsang during Period 
III could, in essence, be interpreted as his playing of the old trick of “administrative 
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absorption of politics” (King 1975) to co-opt potential political oppositions into the 
establishment so as to make his administration look more “people-based” rather than 
really listening from the general public. Although the total number of CSD’s members 
dropped more than half to around 67 since July 2007 and remained unchanged till the 
end of Tsang’s term of office, it was still massive enough to counter balance any 
voices from those oppositions that ought to be minority given the “boundary” for 
members’ appointments are well controlled in the hands of the government and not 
transparent as mentioned in the Boundary Rules above. 
 
As King (1975) had predicted decades ago that such “elite integration” or 
“administerisation of politics” could work only in a society in which the general 
public are primarily apolitical. Chan & Chan (2007) echoed that “civil society is no 
longer content to have important decisions made for it; nor is it satisfied with the role 
of keeping the government in check. It demands participation in policy-making. In 
other words, it wants to transform its role from watchdog to partner in governing 
HK.” Given the rise of civil society or the politicization of the “apolitical” strata, 
milestoned by the massive demonstration in July 2003 and followed by a series of 
symbolic social movements happened in Period III as mentioned in Chapter Three, 
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the government is under the demand to work in higher dimensions of public 
participation or establish more direct and dedicated “elite-to-mass” communication 
channels not only to listen to the citizens’ needs of growing diversity but have them 
reflected in the government policy. However, as explained below, even with the much 
enlarged CSD and CPU’s part-time membership, public opinions seemed still unable 
to be aggregated into the policy advisory mechanism. 
 
Authority Rules 
CPU has not been an executive body since its inception. Its authority totally depended 
on how its three bosses adopted the advice it rendered based on their instructions. 
During Period III, Tsang obviously “dictated” the control over CPU and played a 
dominating role comparing with the other two bosses of CPU. Firstly, Tsang’s AO 
background made him fully acquainted with the institutional constraints of the normal 
policy advisory mechanism of government bureaux such that he knew where to place 
the CPU. On the other hand, Henry Tang was conceivably less active given the 
weakened position of CS since the introduction of the POAS by Tung during Period II 
coupled with his own “laisser-faire” style of leadership, whereas John Tsang was in 
fact promoted by and well recognized as an ally of Tsang. Under such circumstances, 
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what could be done by CPU was up to the aspirations of Tsang who seemingly placed 
much more reliance on another policy advisory institution, i.e., the CSD which has 
been established since 1997 by Tung under his own chairmanship with a membership 
size of around 12 prominent figures including the incumbent CE, Leung Chun-ying, 
Gordon Wu Ying-sheung, Victor Li Tzar kuoi, Victor Fung Kwok-king, Allen Lee 
Peng-fei, etc. 
 
The expansion of the CSD, as announced by Tsang in his first Policy Address of 
2005-06 and mentioned in the Position Rules above, has also affected the authority of 
CPU in various ways. First of all, the head of CPU joined the CSD together with the 
CS, the FS and the Director of CE’s office as only one of its four official members. 
Secondly, the Secretary to CSD has been taken up by a team of civil servants within 
the CPU establishment. Apparently, these could be viewed as extending the authority 
of CPU to take leverage of the broader and more powerful membership base of the 
CSD with higher political and economic standing. However, it can be argued that this 
arrangement has displaced the traditional advisory role of CPU to a secondary and 
merely supportive position. Furthermore, the monitoring and control over the works 
of the CSD, such as agenda setting and members’ appointment, etc., would have been 
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under the AO-led Secretariat to the CSD which obviously has a higher degree of 
affinity with Tsang. 
 
Given Tsang’s dominance, the authority of CPU essentially depended on him. From 
the appointment of Lau Sai-leung to CPU as explained in the Boundary Rules above 
and the substantial expansion of the CSD in this section, Tsang did not look to the 
CPU for policy advice which he could “comfortably” resorted to his AO-ruling class 
occupying most of the posts of the directors of bureaux during his second term of 
office. Moreover, Tsang’s further expansion of the POAS in 2008 for creating the 
second tier political appointees, who were supposed to take care of the lobbying work 
with political parties, also diminished the authority of CPU for its “politics role” that 
was once played, and played well, during Period I. Therefore, the authority of CPU 
was much reduced. Other impacts from the reduced authority of CPU were its 
deliverables.  
 
Scope Rules 
On the face of it, the CPU remarkably issued more research reports and conducted 
more seminars during Period III than in Period II if only those published on its 
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website since 2000 are considered. Having said that and as the only few observable 
outcomes of CPU, this observation can be interpreted in two opposite ways.  
 
On the one hand, Professor Lau tried to maintain his presence by releasing more 
research reports through the outsourced projects undertaken by private think tanks and 
universities. On the other hand, the CPU was then displaced or downgraded based on 
the assumption that those important researches had been kept confidential or handled 
directly by the respective bureau when the POAS looked more “harmonized” due to 
the stronger affinity between Tsang and his AO peers who took up the majority of the 
posts of directors of bureaux. The possible outcome would be the CPU had “spare” 
hands and time to perform even the less important research that could be released to 
the public. This echoed with the reduced authority of CPU explained under the 
authority rules above. 
 
Aggregation Rules 
During the colonial days, with the support of its relatively small yet highly qualified 
pool of Part-time Members drawn from the economic elites of society, CPU managed 
to act fast in giving advice to its bosses, such as the New Airport Development 
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Strategy which re-built the community confidence after the June 4th incident in 1989 
as mentioned in Period I. However, given the CPU membership has been opened up 
to a wider spectrum of the society and displaced by the more prominently positioned 
CSD, the main arena of aggregating public opinions would no longer be in CPU. 
 
On the other hand, and given the massive CSD and CPU’s membership as mentioned 
in the Position Rules above, it is doubtful how deep the deliberation among the 
members could be. Rather, they could only voice out opinions subject to the officials’ 
decisions. The other dimension stemming out from the Position Rules was the 
“homogeneity” of the members’ views given the majority of them would be those 
acceptable to the government, leaving behind the minority places for those to be 
“co-opted” as already explained under the Position Rules above. 
 
In any case, no matter what advices were aggregated by way of CPU’s own research 
team or provision through outsourced research project or from Part-time Members, it 
was still up to Tsang and his fellow AO ruling class in the bureaux to accept the 
advice or not. In the interview with an ex-CPU Part-time Member as reported in the 
RTHK TV programme (RTHK 2011), Mr. Kwong Chun-yu, the incumbent Yuen Long 
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District Councillor who was appointed from January 2010 to December 2011 to CPU 
and had participated in the social movement of the anti-Express Rail Link project in 
2009, stated that whether the government actually paid any attention to the 
recommendations made by CPU’s members remained in doubt. Even some of the 
members had the intention to contribute good opinions for government policies, the 
influences were not as high as people may think. He thus viewed that the CPU’s 
advisory role has been fading out since the handover and doubted the government did 
not want to listen to the advisory body it established which contributed to its isolation 
from society and failure to aggregate public opinions into the policy-making process. 
 
In short, given the dominancy of Tsang during Period III, both the authority of CPU 
and the manner and degree it could aggregate public opinions were dependent on 
Tsang and his AO ruling class. The closing remarks made in the RTHK TV 
programme aforementioned is recapped here: “the government seemingly just want 
advisors that will confirm them in paths that they have decided to take anyway rather 
than seeking plain and unvarnished advice from the advisors”. In reality, the 
“top-town” or “elite” way of policy-making since the colonial days continued during 
Tsang’s era which was not surprising in view of his own AO-background and the 
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networks of elites among his peers. 
 
Information Rules 
The appointment of CPU’s Full-time and Part-time Members remained secretive as in 
the previous periods. In terms of its outcomes, Professor Lau kept his stance of 
refusing to release the results of the polling conducted by CPU and those confidential 
research reports. CPU thus still remained as a “black box” during Period III. Although 
more un-confidential research reports and seminars were catered to the public, those 
were regarded as less important as mentioned above. 
 
Payoff Rules 
Same as Period II, CPU was still fully funded by public money but in view of the 
stronger public demand on accountability, citizens as taxpayers tend to ask for greater 
transparency on the operation of CPU especially on the “secretive” appointment 
mechanism for its Full-time and Part-time Members, who obtained the benefit of 
getting access to insiders’ information and enjoyed a higher social status though to a 
lesser extent during Period III when CPU had been re-positioned as already explained 
under the Position Rules above. In fact, what is more worrying in the eyes of the 
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public was as Mr. Alan Leong Kah-kit, the leader of Civic Party, once commented in 
an interview of a RTHK TV programme (RTHK 2011b) that: “CPU may have been 
relegated to a body that only serves the selfish interests of Donald Tsang’s ruling 
line-up”. Unfortunately this seems to be even worse in Period IV.  
 
Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity 
Through the analysis on the interrelationships between the different institutional 
rules-in-use, it is observed that the CPU regressed further and became less significant 
than before in the eyes of its bosses including Tsang himself, who actually looked 
upon his own AO-ruling class for policy advice or ideas while maintaining the 
“top-down” policymaking approach under the cosmetic cover of “political 
co-optation” institutional arrangements like the expanded size of CPU and CSD 
membership. Although he might pragmatically make good use of his own “spin 
doctors” to market his policy for stronger political support which did bring with him a 
higher citizens’ rating during his early days of governance, the growing social 
turbulence by rising civil society who demands real civic engagement and partnership 
with government on policy-making punctured the cosmetic cover later as reflected by 
the significantly dropped people’s level of satisfaction with the HKSAR Government 
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as highlighted in Chapter Three. 
 
With the change of CE, Tsang took up his duty from June 2005 to 2012, and Professor 
Lau was still appointed as the head of CPU during this period. The structure, power, 
interaction and ethical standard of CPU were disarticulated in this period. First, the 
breakdown of relationship between Lau and Tsang was intensified. It could be 
attributed to the prominent expansion of CSD membership and the diminished role of 
CPU as the CSD became the most important advisory body. It seemed that the 
structure was established with the appointment of diversified membership with an 
average of 42 Part-time Members to give advice. However, it seems that there is no 
direct outcome from the CPU and the real tasks of the unit were unclear. CPU was 
repositioned as a “policy advice coordinator” but their authority and scope did not 
match with each other. Second, Professor Lau was no longer the spokesperson of the 
government. Instead, Tsang invited Lau Sai-leung, a spin-doctor and an experienced 
commentator to join CPU as the Full-time Member. This was the “political 
marketing” campaign of Tsang’s administration (Cheng, 2013, p.118). It implied that 
the relationship between the head of CPU and CE was not intimate. The 
disarticulation of its structure, power, interaction and ethics results in the CPU in this 
period remaining on Level 1 maturity. CPU could not function well enough in this 
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period to achieve Level 2 maturity.     
 
Period IV: Leung Chun-ying era (2012 - Present) 
Since Shiu Sin-por assumed the position as head of CPU in July 2012, the CPU has 
come across as a politicized unit in support of the Government. Unlike his 
predecessors, Shiu attempted to bring changes to the CPU by extending the unit’s role 
beyond a government think tank, and expanding influences in new dimensions. 
Comparing with the previous three periods, there are changes in Ostrom’s seven rules 
during Period IV which affect the various features of the CPU. 
 
Boundary Rules 
One of the more noticeable changes happens in the rules governing the entry and exit 
of participants. In the past, staff of the CPU entered their roles by appointment and 
left mainly for the reasons of resignation or retirement. This has been the norm over 
the years for the relatively small workforce of the unit. However, Xian (2012) 
reported that from July to December 2012, that is within six months after Shiu took 
office, one-third of the CPU’s research team members were forcefully removed from 
their posts for the purpose of renewing the staff composition. Among the 6 staff 
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members concerned who were all appointed at the time of Professor Lau, two of them 
were respectively Principal Researcher and Senior Researcher with at least 7 years’ 
relevant experience. The CPU’s decision to terminate the appointments of 4 staff and 
not to renew the contracts of the other two staff was unprecedented. When asked 
about the controversial termination of appointments followed by recruitment almost 
conducted immediately, the CPU’s spokesman replied that the personnel changes 
were for the “needs” of the unit, despite critics’ argument that vacancies have been 
reserved for Leung’s supporters.   
 
On the other hand, legislative councillors also questioned the criteria for selecting and 
appointing the Full-time Members of CPU (Panel on Public Service, Legislative 
Council 2012). In this regard, Shiu insisted that “all the Full-time Members were 
appointed according to their expertise and capability, regardless of their political 
stance and whether they were well-known to the public.” This statement did not 
convince legislative councillors who stressed the importance of objectivity in making 
public appointments. Apparently, the head of CPU have exercised influences in 
determining the attributes of its participants and thereby setting the entry and exit 
rules. 
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Position Rules 
By adopting a different boundary rule to control entry and exit, the CPU can further 
control the establishment of positions, and the number and types of participants to 
hold the positions. Some subtle changes of the present CPU can be observed from its 
membership size and diversity of composition.  
 
In general, the unit remains to be small composing of core members including the 
Head, the Deputy Head, 3 Full-time Members, the Research Director and 9 Senior 
Researchers (Central Policy Unit 2012b). Apart from having suspended the hiring of 
Principal Researcher since late 2012, the original organizational structure has 
remained largely in place.  
 
The current term CPU intended to expand its membership size by increasing the 
number of both Full-time Members and Associate Members (formerly known as 
“Part-time Members”). In November 2012, Shiu briefed the Panel on Public Service 
on the proposal to create a non-civil service position of Full-time Member (4) in CPU 
who would deepen policy research in public opinion, particularly the new media 
(Panel on Public Service, Legislative Council 2012). The proposal was eventually 
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withdrawn due to lack of support in the LegCo. It was also observed that the pool of 
Associate Members has been increased from 23 in March 2013 to 31 in March 2014, 
with the possibility of offering more new appointments in future (news.gov.hk 
2014b).  
 
CPU’s membership today has become diversified comparing with the past three 
periods. In addition to academics and representatives from the business and public 
sectors, CPU also appointed individuals with political, social enterprise or social 
service background as Associate Members to participate in the consultation work. The 
increase of members from various sectors of the community may reflect 
Government’s demands on CPU for advice on new and pressing policy matters. 
 
Authority Rules 
With membership expanded and the types of members more diversified, the CPU has 
to review its authority rule so that participants in their particular positions have shared 
understandings about what actions they must, may or may not take.  
 
Being a think tank in nature, the CPU’s major function has always been “to provide 
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advice to the CE, the CS, and the FS” according to the Government (news.gov.hk 
2012). Apart from conducting policy research and drafting the annual Policy Address, 
it also analyzes community concerns over public policy issues. However, as the CPU 
does not possess real execution power, the influence of CPU is dependent on its 
relationship with the clients, especially the CE.   
 
Contrasting the relationship between Professor Lau and Tsang in Period III, Shiu 
appears to be Leung’s reliable and loyal partner. Since Shiu took office, the CPU has 
caught the attention of the media and the public with a few major events such as 
appointing Sophia Kao as a Full-time Member to coordinate appointments to about 
400 government advisory bodies, and taking over the administration of the Public 
Policy Research Funding Scheme from the RGC starting from 2013-14. The former 
was treated as a new authority of the CPU since personnel management was never 
part of its major duties and responsibilities before. Although the CS reassured that the 
CPU is neither empowered nor entrusted to “approve, decide on or veto the 
appointments of candidates nominated by policy bureaux” (news.gov.hk 2012), the 
media revealed that Kao has de facto power originating from the CE (Lam denial in 
doubt as Kao power revealed, The Standard 2012). These incidents show that the 
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CPU under Shiu may not consult the policy bureaux, LegCo and other stakeholders 
even for controversial issues. 
 
Scope Rules 
While members of the CPU are assigned with additional sets of actions based on the 
Authority Rule, the potential outcomes that are linked to their actions are supposedly 
delimited by the Scope Rule. In Period IV, assisting the CE in preparing the Policy 
Address continues to be one of the important outcomes of the CPU. However, 
following the changes in authority, the scope allowed has been extended to providing 
advice on candidates suitable for appointment to statutory and advisory bodies, and 
collecting and analyzing public opinions for the Government’s reference. Unlike the 
former heads of CPU, Shiu made an open remark that the unit, as one of the 
government organizations, is a “government tool” and should carry out duties as 
assigned by the three top Government officials (Panel on Public Service 2012). This 
aroused public concern that instead of providing objective advice to the government, 
the CPU would rally support for the government through the mass media. Should this 
be the case, the scope rules would be ineffective in delimiting the potential outcomes 
arising from CPU’s expanding activities.  
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Aggregation Rules 
As a “government tool” with expanded authority and a widening scope of functional 
domains, the CPU can arguably reach decisions without aggregating public opinions 
nowadays. This is manifested in the widening gap between the Government’s policies 
and the public’s expectations, despite CPU’s claim that its monitoring of various 
media would let the Government better grasp community sentiments. Moreover, the 
CPU has been criticized for allegedly not renewing the appointment of Associate 
Members with different opinions. If the majority of CPU’s members come from 
Leung’s camp, their similar preferences would likely be transformed into CPU’s 
collective and binding decisions. 
 
Information Rules 
As the CPU has become more inclined to serve the Government’s interest, it is not 
surprising that most of its information has to be held secret. Since Shiu become the 
new head of CPU, he has stressed the importance of confidentiality among its 
members so as to prevent the leakage of any immature policies of the Government. 
The CS echoed Shiu’s view and explained that CPU’s research is for the 
Government’s internal reference and discussion only (news.gov.hk 2014). Regarding 
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the availability of information to the public, the CS also commented that research 
projects undertaken by the CPU would be made public “as far as possible, provided 
that such disclosure will neither affect the proper and effective conduct of the research 
work of the CPU, nor inhibit the frankness and candour of discussion within the 
Government”. Although the current term CPU has made 14 of its research public on 
the website, only 6 of them are released as full reports and others as executive 
summaries. The CPU almost does not interact with the public as well; since 
September 2012, only one seminar and one forum have been held. Nevertheless, the 
CPU has become more responsive to media criticisms. It has published three “CPU 
Statements” and one “CPU’s response to media enquiries” since December 2012.   
 
Payoff Rules 
As a result of the above changes in boundary rule, position rule, authority rule and 
scope rule, the new and social media tend to associate the assignment of benefits and 
costs within CPU with political stance. A recent example is concerned about the 
allocation of funding from the Public Policy Research Funding Scheme. It has been 
reported that since 2012/13, the pro-Beijing think tank One Country Two Systems 
Research Institute has received approximately HK$2.7 million for conducting 
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research commissioned by the CPU (CPU research fund granted to One Country Two 
Systems Research Institute again, Mingpao 2014). Owing to the fact that Leung was 
one of the Institute’s founders, Shiu was its Executive Director and its current 
Executive Director was appointed by Leung to the Executive Council, CPU’s 
allocation of such a large sum of funding to the Institute appeared to be problematic in 
the eyes of the public. It is generally perceived that the allocation of such a large 
amount of funding is a positive reward for political relations and support. 
 
Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity 
The seven rules-in-use have changed further in Period IV under the new leadership, 
with cumulative effect on CPU’s participants, positions, actions, outcomes, and 
information.  With the new office of Leung in 2012, the role of CPU was 
strengthened in terms of its prominent political stance after Shiu became the head of 
the CPU. With a good relationship between Shiu and Leung, as both of them were the 
former executive director of the “One Country Two Systems Research Institute” and 
also the Chairman respectively, they may know the needs of each other. The 
relationship between Shiu and Leung should be the most harmonious when compared 
with the previous periods.  
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Various actions showed that the CPU is empowered in this period in some sense. 
Given the clue from the Authority Rules, the appointment of Sophia Kao as a 
coordinator to recruit the members for the 400 government advisory bodies and also 
the rescind of the appropriation of the public policy research fund demonstrated its 
power, even though the actions brought tremendous controversy in the society. In fact, 
the power of CPU in this period is quite strong because the CPU could eliminate the 
Associate Members with different opinion from the stance of government.  
 
The power in the period was undoubtedly empowered given by the CE. Without CE 
support, CPU could not become a rather strong entity in front of the public and media. 
Although it had no real execution power, the influence of CPU was magnified under 
this period. The power and its interaction with other bodies were interlinked even 
though there were many controversies over the society. Same as the previous periods, 
its ethical standard was internalized that most of the research were kept confidential. 
It is concluded that under Shiu and Leung, CPU can achieve Level 2 maturity in this 
period. 
 
The question now is whether CPU can achieve Level 3 at the moment. Level 3 
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maturity is the most demanding level. This level emphasized on how integrity can be 
built in into an institution. Being a living entity, exercise of power, endorsement of 
power and embodiment of ethical standards are the keys for this level. In some sense, 
this can be interpreted as the legitimacy of the institution.  
 
As a living entity, it should be based on “institutional value infusion and 
maximization, leading to public consent and a capacity for social capital formation, 
with implications for the efficacy of policy development, implementation and review 
(Thynne 2012). When exercising of power, it involved in the “meeting of public 
needs… in which are not only accepted by a community, but actually endorsed as 
both authorized and justified. For the endorsement of power, meaning that 
“institutions being spontaneously drawn together an acting through an effecting 
meeting of minds, while retaining their own identities and sense of well-being without 
threatening their respective degrees of autonomy”. For ethics, the “ethical standards 
will be complemented by their embodiment in all institutional decisions and action”. 
 
Given the above definition and the analysis, CPU cannot achieve Level 3 maturity in 
this period. When talking about Level 3, it emphasized on “value infusion and 
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maximization”. It is necessary for us to know what the value of CPU behind. But it 
seemed that the value was shifted and even somewhat unclear due to the change of the 
CE. Although, it is very clear that CPU served the CE, CS and FS, CPU gave an 
ambiguous impression to the public. CPU is just like the “Central Propaganda Unit” 
in Period IV. There was no central value that can be clearly conveyed to the public.  
 
When talking about “exercising of power”, meeting public needs is the key for 
exercising of power. It seemed that CPU could not satisfy the public needs even CPU 
conducted different seminars, events and posting research reports on its webpage as 
the number of those activities and availability of research reports were minimal. Also, 
CPU was only confined to serve the CE, CS and FS, it cannot be proved how this 
government think tank can advocate the efficacy of policy development. Being a think 
tank making use of over HKD 88 million for its operational expenditure in 2012 
-2013 (Administration Wing, HKSARG 2013c), the public was doubtful about the 
existence of CPU. 
 
The “endorsement of power” was also minimal throughout all the periods. Being said 
the exercise of power above, public needs could not be satisfied, the endorsement of 
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power then definitely could not be fulfilled as well. The relationship between CPU 
and the community was not close enough for the public to get to know what CPU was 
working on. The CPU definitely had its own degree of autonomy even though it was 
dominated by the CE, but its autonomy could not bring legitimacy to them.  
 
Lastly, it is about the “embodiment of ethical standard”. As information within the 
unit is regarded as secret and government’s reference only, the CPU keptthis as a 
“work ethics” and internalize into the institution. From the institution perspective, it 
can seen that CPU could meet a kind of ethical standard internally. However, 
externally, the public should have some expectation to understand what CPU is 
actually working on in terms of their real functions in the government and for the 
public. 
 
Concluding Comments 
Throughout the four periods, the existence of CPU in terms of its structure, power, 
interaction and ethics was mainly manipulated by the governor during the colonial 
period and the CE after 1997 respectively. The boundary for entering the CPU as the 
Head was largely bounded by favoritism of the governor or CE. But the dynamic 
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between the head of the CPU and the governor or CE could be different from the 
original intent of the CE as exemplified during Period II and Period III. The mistrust 
between them minimized the authority and scope of the CPU during Period II and III. 
In contrast, the head of CPU and governor or CE had a better relationship during 
Period I and IV, so that the authority and scope of the CPU was slightly magnified but 
also more politicized in trying to help advance the rule of the government.  
 
Following the analysis above, the established structure of the CPU does not 
necessarily mean that it can achieve a higher level of institutional maturity. The 
evaluation shows that the CPU achieved different levels of institutional maturity in 
the four periods: it started at Level 2 in Period I but regressed to Level 1 in Period II 
and III; during Period IV, the CPU progresses to Level 2 maturity. The variation of the 
level of maturity during different periods is mainly attributed to the change of power 
and authority of the CPU which made it unable to function very well. The 
degeneration of the CPU is mainly caused by the change of the leadership of the HK 
Government which vacillates the positioning of CPU all over the period.  
 
As HK citizens have increasingly high expectations on government departments and 
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publicly-funded bodies, the CPU is expected to progress steadily for both the 
long-term development itself and the betterment of the public. In the next chapter, the 
project is concluded with some recommendations for the CPU. 
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Chapter Five   Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Introduction 
The CPU, supposedly a think tank for the HK Government, has witnessed 25 years of 
history from 1989 through the handover up to the present. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, its role, structure and control has changed significantly over the 
years, depending heavily on the "bosses" that it was serving. This Chapter aims to 
conclude the main findings of the study. Learning from the history of the CPU itself 
and drawing from overseas experience, some recommendations are suggested for the 
way forward for the CPU.   
 
The research questions revisited 
In Chapter One, five research questions were posed, the first one being "what type of 
institutions could a government adopt to generate policy ideas". Think tanks are one 
type of institutions which generate policy ideas and have particular significance in 
terms of their institutional dynamics and the impact on governance. Firstly, the 
definitions of think tanks were reviewed, which are diverse in typologies, depending 
on the perspectives taken when doing the classification. Yet, think tanks serve the 
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basic purpose to make policy advice available for policy-makers. Think tanks have 
the significant function of linking between the “knowledgeable” and “the powerful” 
of the society ('t Hart, 2006). They also deal with the “policy” and “politics” 
dimensions by serving the roles of “policy analyst” and “lobbyist” behind the scene in 
the policy-making process. This function is particularly important given the modern 
complex society as McGann pointed out: “In the world filled with tweets and sound 
bites that are often superficial and politically charged, it is critical to know where to 
turn for sound policy proposals that address the complex policy issues that 
policymakers and the public face.” (TTCSP 2014a) 
 
Regarding the local context, this study does not look at any single, substantive policy 
problem that HK faces, but it focuses on how policy ideas are generated and in 
particular the effectiveness of the HK Government’s own think tank, i.e. the CPU, 
through the analytical lens of the seven institutional rules-in-use developed by Ostrom 
(1999) and the concept of institutional maturity of Thynne (2011) as described in 
Chapter Two across the timeline of CPU’s development since 1989.  
 
Chapter Three gives an outline on the origin and history of CPU to address the 
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research question of why the government has decided to establish and operate the 
CPU. CPU’s history since its establishment has been divided into four periods 
basically by the tenures of governors before 1997 and the CEs after the handover until 
now. Each period is distinctive from each other with the key contextual changes of 
CPU both internally and externally, especially highlighted was the impact caused by 
the changes in leadership. Moreover, it can be observed that such contextual changes 
interact in a dynamic manner and influence the positioning of CPU when it reacted to 
such contextual changes. 
 
In Chapter Four, to evaluate "how the change in leadership, from the pre-1997 period 
to the post-1997 period, influenced the role, structure and control of the CPU" and "to 
what extent the CPU is an effective and a mature think tank contributing to the 
effective governance in HK", the facts of contextual changes as described in Chapter 
Three were collated with the seven institutional rules-in-use along the horizon of 
CPU’s level of maturity. It is observed that the CPU would adjust or re-position itself 
along the seven rules-in-use in response to those contextual changes. However, the 
most important change was the change of government leadership which expanded or 
delimited CPU’s boundary, authority and position, and led to further knock-on 
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influences over its scope or outcomes as well as the way information was collected or 
released, the way that decisions were aggregated among players and their pay-off 
given the seven rules-in-use are highly interrelated. 
 
Such institutional dynamics also resulted in CPU’s regression in terms of institutional 
maturity from Period I to Period III mainly due to the lack of trust between the CEs 
and Heads of CPU as concluded in Chapter Four. However, the progression made 
during Period IV has to be remarked with a caveat. Although the level of trust and 
working relationship between the incumbent CE and head of CPU are better than their 
predecessors of Period II and III, the CPU seems heading to a direction that deviates 
from the expected role of think tank as “policy analyst” for the government acting for 
the public interest of the society. There seems to be a growing “over-shadow” of the 
“public policy” elements by “politics” over the work of CPU. As mentioned in the 
beginning of this Chapter, think tanks do sometimes need to handle “politics” and the 
CPU had undertaken such tasks of maintaining liaison with the Chinese Government 
required during Period I and performed well for the interests of the society at that time. 
However, nowadays the CPU seems to be serving a narrow purpose for political 
line-up and propaganda at the expense of “public policy” development. 
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Some Lessons Learnt from Other Think Tanks  
In HK, the study of think tanks receives attention very recently as it was reported in 
July 2014 that the LegCo President, Jasper Tsang Yok-sing, planned a fact-finding 
trip to the United States to study think tanks before attempting to form one in HK and 
he had commissioned a group of experts to study how to nurture a mature think tank 
earlier on. Also in the same newspaper report, Andrew Fung Ho-Keung, the chief 
executive of the Policy Research Institute said: “the city might have very good 
infrastructure, but the software is still lacking and there is yet to be any policy 
research with great impact in this town.” (Lam, Cheung & Ng 2014). 
 
In Mainland China, the importance of think tanks on improving policy-making 
process and strengthening of their development with Chinese characteristics have also 
been stressed by the Communist Party of China at its Central Committee’s meeting 
held on 12 November 2013 (Communist Party of China, 2013 and Hu, 2014) with the 
first ever think tank summit held in June 2014, Shanghai which was well received 
(Chang, 2014). 
 
The think tanks in China and HK are generally smaller in numbers with shorter years 
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of establishment than their counterparts in leading western democratic countries and 
do not achieve prominent standings in the 2013 GGTTTI (TTSSP 2014a). For 
instance, only two private think tanks in HK appeared in the 2013 GGTTTI, namely 
Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research ranked 35 out of 80 in the sub-category of 
Domestic Economic Policy Think Tank, and Civic Exchange Hong Kong in the 
sub-category of Environment Think Tank ranked 44 out of 70 (Winn 2014 and TTCSP 
2014a). Therefore, some successful cases of overseas think tanks are examined. 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the Chatham House is one of the most renowned think 
tanks which is a key partner of the UK government on regional and international 
topics like global health, economics and international security (.chathamhouse.org, 
2014).  The institutional foundations and maturity of the Chatham House are briefly 
evaluated below, with highlights on lessons that can be drawn for the CPU.   
  
The Chatham House got two clear core values, namely non-partisan and independence. 
These values are reflected in the mechanism of selecting its Presidents. The institution 
set up boundary rules to appoint three senior political figures from major political 
parties in UK as the Presidents of Chatham House. In 2014, Sir John Major, Lord 
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Ashdown and Baroness Scotland were appointed as the Presidents of the institute. Sir 
John Major, the former UK Prime Minister, represented the value of Conservative 
Party (UK); Lord Ashdown is the former leader of Liberal Democrats (UK) from 
1988 to 1999; and Baroness Scotland, the former Attorney General for England and 
Wales, represented the value of Labour Party (UK) and racial equality because of her 
personal background (.chathamhouse.org, 2014). When comparing the CPU with 
Chatham House, setting an objective entry and exit rules and expanding the boundary 
for members with various political backgrounds may avoid controversy and ensure 
trusted research outputs of a think tank.   
 
Besides its Presidents, the Chatham House established various positions to fulfill 
diverse functions. It is governed by one Patron, three Presidents, a Council and a 
Senior Advisors Panel based on the Chatham House Charter and Bylaws. The Queen 
of UK has been the Patron since 1952, and the three Presidents are senior political 
leaders from different political parties at Westminster. These arrangements reflect the 
high authority and influential status of the Chatham House. For Institution members, 
any individuals and organizations around the world could apply for a membership. 
Many of the members are from the business sector, media agencies, 
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non-governmental organizations, embassies, academic institutions, and even other 
think tanks. Council members are drawn from or elected by the institution member to 
ensure transparency and political neutrality. In contrast with Chatham House, the 
neutrality and transparency of CPU are being criticized since Shiu, Leung’s key 
supporter, assumed the position as Head of CPU in 2012. A transparent, non-partisan 
and open governing mechanism might legitimize the scopes of service provided by 
the institution.  
 
In addition to its Presidents and members, the Chatham House got more than 200 
experts who provide expertise across a range of topics and issues, and carry out 
independent and rigorous research on global, regional and country-based issues such 
as climate change, global health, international economics, international security, 
Africa Programme, Americas Programme, Asia Programme and Russia and Eurasia 
Program. Researches are initiated by experts and are individually funded by each 
centre (Chatham House 2014). In contrast with Chatham House, the service scope of 
CPU is limited to local and cross-boundary issues. CPU was only given authority to 
provide policy proposals to the HKSAR government on regional and international 
issues. It has to rely on think tanks which work closely with the Chinese Government 
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with regard to international security and economics. For example, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences carried out a continuous research on development in 
Africa since 1998 in order to facilitate the Chinese Government to boost its influence 
in Africa in the past decade (Ng 2014).  
 
Besides carrying out research, another major task of the Chatham House includes 
producing regular publications like “The World Today”, a bi-monthly magazine which 
presents analysis and commentary on global issue, and “International Affairs”, a 
leading journal on international and public affairs. These publications and experts’ 
comments on website were frequently quoted by international media, and have a high 
impact on setting political and policy agenda and crafting new initiative globally. An 
expert of Chatham House, Dr. Tim Summers, posted his comments “White Paper 
Does Not Mark Major Shift on Hong Kong” on July 11, 2014 (Summers 2014), and 
his view has been widely quoted and discussed among HK media in the same month.  
 
On top of publications, Members Events and Conferences are also the important 
outcomes of the Chatham House. The Chatham House organized around 100 
members events, around 200 research workshops, and around 20 one- or two-day 
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conferences and various private roundtable discussion. Many of these events are open 
to members and the public, only some of them are by invitation only. Participants 
could exchange information and express themselves freely under the famous 
“Chatham House Rule”, which means that the source of information was being 
protected. The Chatham House could also aggregate public views before drafting 
research publications and recommendations which are highly influential in shaping 
the political arena. Also, most of the events are held on record, either in video, audio 
or transcription formats, and information could be accessed easily via internet. The 
openness of Chatham House gives the participants confidence that their voices are 
being heard, and Chatham House would remain neutral when discussions take place. 
 
Regarding its source of income, the Chatham House is mainly funded by donations 
from philanthropists, corporate members and individual members. The 
membership-based funding is crucial to the independence of the institution, although 
some literature challenged that the Chatham House represents pro-establishment value 
since the institution is mainly funded by International Corporation and governments 
(Fotopoulos 2009). 
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In the aspect of institutional maturity, the Chatham House achieved Level 3 Maturity 
and met the “high standards of integrity” (Thynne 2012) through its structure, 
exercise of power, endorsement of power and ethical standard. Level 3 maturity 
focuses on whether the institutional values have been maximized. The value of the 
Chatham House is the “building [of] a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world” 
(Chatham House 2014). The Chatham House maximizes this value by carrying out 
trusted and independent analysis on regional and global issues, developing new ideas 
and recommendations to international challenges, and arranging open debates and 
events with world leaders and partners, such as the London Conference and the annual 
Chatham House Prize. The contribution of the Chatham House has given a clear 
image to the public. As an UK-based think tank, the institution won public recognition 
over the world. The institution ranked the No. 1 think tank outside the US for six 
consecutive years and No. 2 worldwide for 3 consecutive years according to the 
TTCSP (2014c).  
 
To meet Level 3 institutional maturity, meeting public needs is the key for exercising 
power, and the Chatham House satisfied public needs and expectation through 
conducting conferences and seminars for members and the public, and records of 
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most of the events are uploaded to website for members’ reference. This arrangement 
could ensure that the needs of participants were being heard in the aggregation 
process. Also, although the Chatham House does not have the authority to participate 
in policy implementation, the institution has a high impact on setting policy agenda in 
the policy-making process. For example, the institution delivers policy-relevant 
analysis and innovative ideas to policy-makers through Parliamentary Briefings and 
international conferences like United Nations (Chatham House 2014). The Chatham 
House enjoyed a close relationship with the community, and the public endorsed the 
institution’s contribution and independence by giving financial support to the 
institution’s research and activities. Financial independence also brings legitimacy to 
the institution’s researches and findings. 
 
Another key element for Level 3 maturity is the “embodiment of ethical standard”.  
The Chatham House meets ethical standard both internally and externally. Since the 
institution is solely funded by members’ donation, members are eligible to elect 
council members, the people who are responsible for management and operation of 
the Chatham House. Moreover, the Chatham House encourages openness and the 
sharing of information through the famous “Chatham House Rule”. Such ethical 
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standard was widely used among governments and business corporations nowadays, 
and was treated as “morally binding” to encourage information flow. 
 
Recommendations 
Act as Network Administration Organisation of the metagovernance network 
Taking into account that the CPU is now being distant from the community and 
learning from the example of the Chatham House, the CPU can adjust or re-position 
its institutional setting against different rule-in-use so as to play the role of “Network 
Administrator Organisation” (“NAO”) under the concept of metagovernance (Torfing, 
Peters, Pierre & Sorensen 2012) that provides new perspectives for public governance. 
Traditionally, the mode of generation of policy advice by the CPU or government 
departments is predominantly through self-production, i.e. bureaucrats to initiate the 
policies themselves that they believe are in the interest of the general public or solve 
the public problem in the way they perceive. Under the concept of metagovernance, 
the generation of policy ideas is viewed as a multi-centric network in contrast with the 
traditional “top-down” or “elite-mass” approach. The NAO in metagovernance is to 
govern the policy idea generation network. 
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To do so, CPU will need to adjust its different institutional rules-in-use. For instance, 
CPU’s boundary and position will need to be expanded to be more embracing and 
balanced for its membership and composition together with a re-aligned and perhaps 
written statement of authority like the case of Chatham House having its own 
governing council, charter and bye-laws. The transparency of the CPU has to be 
enhanced too in the sense of the information rule for its members’ appointment, 
researches topics selection and their publication, which helps to build trust and 
accountability in the eyes of citizens given the CPU is fully funded by public money. 
The CPU, if positioned itself as an NAO of the policy ideas network through 
adjusting its institutional rules-in-use, can enhance communication to build shared 
mental models among players in policy ideas arena, to develop reciprocity and trust 
among them. This new purpose or position, if to be adopted, is important driven by 
the fact that public problems are now becoming complex that demands “joined-up” 
solutions (Blaire 1997) in a more integrative manner and no single party can now 
dominate the development of “policy recipes”. 
 
Practise “Ideas brokerage”  
The NAO positioning of CPU also echoed with the new way of thinking of “ideas 
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brokerage” for think tank (’t Hart, 2006) which argued that “it is no longer about 
producing but about locating research, and it is no longer about getting “leverage” for 
one’s own ideas but about effective brokerage, i.e., organising interaction between and 
discursively connecting suppliers and consumers on the market for policy ideas.” As 
such, CPU can act as a “ideas broker”, who “do not engage in but rather facilitate 
ideas production probably by others so as to get the ideas evolve and “land” in the 
right places at the right times” as stated by ’t Hart. This involves CPU to work in a 
different way of aggregating public opinions as well as adjusting its scope of activities 
such that policy forums, briefings, conferences, publications and etc., like the case of 
Chatham House, will definitely need to be enhanced. 
 
Following this logic, the priorities of the CPU will shift from maximizing its capacity 
to produce knowledge to building up expertise in the management of complex 
network and policy process. 
 
Nurture local think tank developments as a network 
Given the growing significance of think tanks in HK and even Mainland China in the 
recent years as highlighted above, how to provide the environment to nurture their 
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development is collateral to the quality of policy ideas that could be generated. In this 
regard, the CPU adjusts its mode of aggregation and scope by stepping back from 
self-production of policy ideas by itself to facilitate the development of think tanks in 
society, which could then be leveraged to identify and work with relevant 
stakeholders like the civil societies, political parties and government officials to work 
out solutions among themselves. Given local think tanks are generally green, CPU can 
adjust the payoff mechanism of the new policy ideas network to provide research 
grants or seed funds to nurture their development. 
 
In short, CPU can re-positioned itself by adjusting its various institutional rules-in-use 
aforementioned so as to help to build a strong network of think tanks working on the 
principles of evidence-based, objectivity and policy analysis focus, which will be able 
to counteract with the emotional, superficial and populism driven war of words in 
current political habitat of Hong Kong. The move is also supplemental to practicing of 
“Deliberative Democracy” (Fishkin 2009), or more specifically Deliberative Polling, 
which requires the involvement of policy experts that think tanks can provide. 
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Limitations of the study 
This study mainly discusses how the institutional dynamics of the CPU in different 
period of times contributes to the effective governance of HK Government given the 
contextual background and challenges as outlined in Chapter Three. The study only 
looks from outside on how different parties involved in the CPU as mentioned in 
Chapter Four affected the effectiveness of the CPU according to the analytical 
framework integrating different institutional rules-in-use and institutional maturity 
set-out in Chapter Two when offering policy advice to the government. The analytical 
framework points to what institutional changes could be made to CPU towards its 
further development of institutional maturity with new positioning as what have been 
mentioned in the recommendations above. However, whether such changes could be 
realized of not requires other element that is beyond the scope of this study but needs 
to be looked into. 
 
Moreover, the study is limited by information sources, which relies only on desktop 
research such as newspaper reporting, criticism, column, LegCo papers and official 
documents from the government as the main empirical evidence for analysis. No 
internal document and interviews are obtained and conducted to get first-hand 
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information from the previous Full-time or Part-time members and other government 
departments or bureaus. The CPU, as a “black box”, still lacks open access of 
information for the public and therefore the material obtained from the CPU is limited, 
not to mention its evidences of interactions with other departments or bureaux. Such a 
deficiency in information also leads to the analysis on the causal link between those 
researches conducted by the CPU and polices eventually adopted by the government 
as reflected in the policy addresses difficult if not impossible. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
From this study, the CPU does need to change its positioning through different 
institutional rules-in-use for its further and sustainable development of institutional 
maturity in the effective governance of HK. In fact, no single institution can survive 
the tides of time without making any change and the only thing that does not change 
is change itself. The recommendations made while drawing lessons learnt from 
Chatham House shed light on the fundamental values that the CPU need to embrace 
for its long-term development and institutional maturity. However, the missing 
element is how to make it happen which is obviously not easy and actually depends 
on leadership. Think tanks provide with the knowledge for leaders to exercise powers. 
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However, “Knowledge is power but only if you know how to acquire it” (The 
Economist, 2003) and Krugman (2014) even remarked that “Knowledge isn’t power” 
nowadays when “[politicians] listened to economists telling them what they wanted to 
hear … [they] pick and choose which experts or, in many cases, “experts” to believe, 
the odds are that they will choose badly … All of which raises a troubling question: 
Are we as societies even capable of taking good policy advice”. 
 
Leadership is a critical component of good public governance. Leadership leads to 
enhanced management capacity and organizational performance (OECD 2001). The 
CPU, with its adjusted positioning as NAO as recommended above, may result in the 
generation of good policy acceptable by the society. Whether such a change is to be 
pursued or not hinges on the vision of the leaders of CPU and its bosses. However, 
what is even more fundamental in leadership is how to gain trust between the leaders 
and their followers while implementing the change which in turns points to further 
research or study on ethics and integrity of leaders of think tanks in future. 
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Appendix A 
 
List of CPU Members 
(Obtained via 1823 hotline) 
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Appendix B 
 
List of CPU research project available on the web 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2014 A Study on Mainland Students' Adjustment in 
Hong Kong 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies, Public Policy 
Research Centre 
2014 A Study on Cross-Boundary Marriages in Hong 
Kong: Causes and Consequences 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2013 A Study on Living Across the Border: Migration 
Pattern, Social Integration and the Wellbeing of 
Hong Kong Families in Shenzhen 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong  
2013 A Study on "Family Impact Analysis and Case 
Studies: Public Rental Housing and 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance" 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2013 A Study on "Epidemiology of Child Abuse and Its 
Geographic Distribution in Hong Kong: An 
Important Social Indicator of Different Districts 
and Communities" 
The University of Hong 
Kong (Community Child 
Health Unit, Department 
of Paediatrics and 
Adolescent Medicine & 
Department of Social 
Work and Social 
Administration) 
2013 A Study on "The Youth Problem" Hong Kong Baptist 
University 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2013 A Study on Multi-stakeholder Engagement: The 
Case of the Guangzhou- Shenzhen- Hong Kong 
Express Rail Link Project 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2013 A Study on Promoting Hong Kong's Modern 
Service Industry in the Economic Cooperation 
between Fujian and Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University 
2013 A Study on Supporting Hong Kong Businesses to 
Tap into Domestic Consumption Market in the 
Pearl River Delta Region 
廣東外語外貿大學南國
商學院 
2013 A Study on New Arrivals from Mainland China Policy 21 Limited 
2012 A Pilot Study on Cross-Boundary Families in 
Hong Kong 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2012 Study on the Manpower Situation and Needs of the 
Arts and Cultural Sector in Hong Kong 
Centre for Culture and 
Development, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong 
& Policy 21 Limited  
2012 A Study on Encouraging Guangdong Enterprises 
to Go Global through Hong Kong 
One Country Two 
Systems Research 
Institute Limited and Sun 
Yat-sen University  
2012 Mobility and Welfare: The Family Strategy of 
Mainland Women Coming to and Giving Birth to 
Children in Hong Kong 
The Centre for Studies of 
Hong Kong, Macao and 
Pearl River Delta, Sun 
Yat-sen University 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2012 Hong Kong Elderly People Retiring in the 
Mainland 
Consumption and 
Development Studies 
Centre, Sun Yat-sen 
University  
2012 Ruling Wisely : A Study on the Wisdom-Pooling 
Decision-Making Model of the Central People's 
Government based on Case Studies of China's Five 
Year Plans 
The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong 
2012 National Consciousness in Post-1997 Hong Kong: 
Adolescents' Construction of Patriotism and 
Identity 
The City University of 
Hong Kong 
2012 Understanding Non-engaged Youths in Hong 
Kong: A Mixed Method Approach 
The Hong Kong 
University of Science and 
Technology 
2012 The Pattern of Urban Life in Hong Kong: A 
District Level Community Study of Sham Shui Po 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2012 An Investigation of the Perception of Social 
Justice across Social Groups 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2012 1st Round of Thematic Household Survey (Use of 
New Media) in 2011 
MOV Data Collection 
Centre Limited 
2012 A Study on the Hong Kong Container Terminal 
Trade 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2012 Parental Perspectives on Child Neglect in Hong 
Kong 
The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2012 Exploratory Study of Neglect Among Elderly in 
Hong Kong: A Family Perspective 
Lingnan University 
2012 A Study on Family-Centered Prevention of 
Adolescent Girls' and Boys' Prostitution 
The City University of 
Hong Kong 
2012 A Study on Drug Abuse Among Youths and 
Family Relationship 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2012 3rd Round of Thematic Household Survey (Topic 
on Hong Kong Families) in 2008 
Nielsen 
2012 2nd Round of Thematic Household Survey (Topic 
on Characteristics of Hong Kong Residents 
Having Resided/ Having Stayed Substantially in 
the Mainland) in 2007 
Nielsen 
2012 Study on Policy Recommendations for Further 
Liberalisation and Deepening of CEPA during the 
12.5 Period 
Greater Pearl River Delta 
Business Council 
2012 Study on Hong Kong's Role in Supporting Chinese 
Enterprises Going Global 
China Institutes of 
Contemporary 
International Relations  
2012 A Study on China's Urban Future and Hong 
Kong's Business Opportunities 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2011 Feasibility Study of Fishing Tourism in Hong 
Kong 
The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University 
2011 Case Study of Hong Kong-Guangdong 
Cooperation in Resource Recovery and Recycling 
Sun Yat-sen University 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2011 Study on Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation in 
Vocational Education: Current Status and Policy 
Suggestions 
Sun Yat-sen University 
2011 Case Study of Hong Kong-Guangdong 
Cooperation in Education and Science and 
Technology in Nansha 
Sun Yat-sen University 
2011 Consultancy Study on Socio-Economic-Political 
Trends in Guangdong Province (4th quarterly 
report) 
Sun Yat-sen University 
2011 A Study on Arts Administrators in Hong Kong Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2011 A Review Study on Cultural Audit: the Landscape 
of Hong Kong's Cultural Infrastructure 
Hong Kong Development 
and Strategy Research 
Centre Ltd 
2011 A Study on Brand Building for Higher Education 
in Hong Kong: Prospects and Strategies 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2011 Study on Implementation of the Pilot Renminbi 
Trade Settlement Scheme in Guangdong Province: 
Evaluation and Policy Recommendations 
Sun Yat-sen University 
2011 Study of Hong Kong's Aviation Industry: Current 
Challenges and Future Strategies 
One Country Two 
Systems Research 
Institute Limited 
2011 A Study on Understanding our Young Generation The University of Hong 
Kong 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2010 A Study on the Postmodern Challenges of the 
Information Society to the Governance of HKSAR 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2010 A Study on Social Attitudes of the Youth 
Population in Hong Kong 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2010 A Focus Group Study on Subsidising Home 
Ownership 
The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University 
2010 A Study on Hong Kong's Post 80s Generation: 
Profiles and Predicaments 
The Hong Kong 
University of Science and 
Technology 
2010 A Study on the Meaning and Practice of Filial 
Piety in Hong Kong and A Review of the Research 
Literature on Filial Piety 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2010 A Study on the Process of Public Policy Decision 
Making at the Central People's Government: A 
Case Study on Health Care Reform Policies 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2010 A Research Study on Mainland Chinese Immigrant 
Artists in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong Baptist 
University 
2010 A Consultancy Study on China's Foreign Policy 
and Hong Kong's Position in Regional 
Developments 
上海國際問題研究院 
2009 A Literature Review of Family Policy in Four East 
Asian Societies 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 A Consultancy Study on the Needs and Integration 
into Local Communities of Hong Kong People 
The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
Living in Shenzhen, Dongguan and Guangzhou 
2009 A Pilot Study for Public Health Policy Model and 
Development Indicator for Child Health in Hong 
Kong 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 A Qualitative Study on 'Hidden Elderly' in Hong 
Kong 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 Study on Yunnan's Co-operation with ASEAN and 
the Greater Mekong Subregion: Recent 
Developments and Implications for Yunnan-Hong 
Kong Co-operation 
One Country Two 
Systems Research 
Institute Limited 
2009 A Comparative Community Study of Tin Shui Wai 
and Sham Shui Po 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 A Study on Hong Kong in the Region: Role, Issues 
and Strategies 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2009 A Study on the Social Networks of Residents in 
Tin Shui Wai 
Hong Kong Baptist 
University 
2009 A Study on Policies and Strategies of Israel and 
Singapore Governments to Attract, Develop and 
Retain Returnee Talents 
Hong Kong Baptist 
University 
2009 A Pilot Study on the Practice of Theatre in Hong 
Kong 
Performing Arts Asia 
2009 A Study on Singapore's Experience in Regional 
Cooperation 
National University of 
Singapore 
2009 A Study on Mapping the Associational Life in Tin The Hong Kong 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
Shui Wai Polytechnic University 
2009 A Further Study on the Future Development of the 
Hong Kong Economy, Consolidation and 
Enhancement of Existing Core Industries and 
Development of Economic Areas with High 
Potential in Hong Kong 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 Study on Hong Kong's Economy: Transformation, 
Competitiveness and Sustainability 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 Study on Cooperation of Producer Services 
Industries between Hunan and Hong Kong 
《湖南与香港加强生产
性服务业合作》课题组 
2009 2008 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic and 
Political Developments in the Mainland, with 
Particular Emphasis on Regional Developments 
and the Guangdong Province, that Have 
Implications for Hong Kong 
Teamone Economist 
Limited 
2009 Study on Low-Wage Workers in Hong Kong Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2009 Study on the Trends in Family Attitudes and 
Values in Hong Kong 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2009 Study on Hong Kong's Professional Immigrants 
from Mainland China and their Strategies of 
Adaptation 
Hong Kong Baptist 
University 
2009 Study on Social Enterprises in Hong Kong Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2009 Study on A Cross-National Comparison of Family 
Policy 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2008 Consultancy Study on International Experience of 
Selected Countries in Supporting the Low-income 
Family in Helping its Members and their 
Applicability to Hong Kong 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2008 2008 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic and 
Political Developments in Pan-Pearl River Delta 
Region (Except the Guangdong Province) and 
their Implications for Hong Kong 
Not known 
2008 2006/07 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic 
and Political Developments in Pan-Pearl River 
Delta Region, Covering Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan 
and Hainan 
Not known 
2008 2006/07 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic 
and Political Developments in Pan-Pearl River 
Delta Region, Covering Guangxi, Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Sichuan 
Not known 
2007 Action Agenda on "China's 11th Five-Year Plan 
and the Development of Hong Kong" 
Focus Groups in the 
Economic Summit on 
“China’s 11th Five-Year 
Plan and the 
Development of Hong 
Kong 
2006 Study on the Relationship between Hong Kong's 
Cultural & Creative Industries and the Pearl River 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
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Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
Delta 
2006 The Development of Economic 
Corridor–ASEAN–Guangxi–Hong Kong 
廣西自治區政府發展研
究中心 
2006 Major Areas of Co-operation Between Yunnan and 
Hong Kong for Entering the Southeast Asia and 
South Asia markets 
雲南省人民政府研究室 
2006 Consultancy Study on Socio-Economic-Political 
Trends in Pan-Pearl River Delta Region 
Not known 
2005 Study on Tripartite Partnership - Local Research 
and Engagement  
Civic Exchange 
2005 Study on Tripartite Partnership - Benchmarking 
Study from an International Perspective 
Hong Kong Policy 
Research Institute Ltd 
2005 Report on Encouraging Guangdong Private 
Enterprises to Set Up Business in Hong Kong 
廣東省政府發展研究中
心 
2004 Study of Mainland Policies and Practices to 
Facilitate Private Enterprises in Setting Up 
Business in Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University 
2004 Study on the Third Sector Landscape in Hong 
Kong 
Five unrelated research 
teams, under the 
leadership of a Project 
Manager 
2004 Background Report: Hong Kong and Pan-Pearl 
River Delta Regional Co-operation 
One Country Two 
Systems Research 
Institute Limited 
The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong: A Study of Institutional Dynamics 
 
 
P.176  
 
 
Year Title of Research Project Consultant 
2004 Hong Kong and The Western Pearl River Delta: 
Cooperative Development from a Cross-Boundary 
Perspective 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2004 Hong Kong's Economic Integration with the Pearl 
River Delta: Quantifying the Benefits and Costs 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
2003 Baseline Study on Hong Kong's Creative 
Industries 
The University of Hong 
Kong 
2003 Socio-economic impact of 24-hour operation of 
Boundary Control Points - Household Survey on 
24-hr Passenger Clearance at Land Boundary 
Control Points  
Marketing Decision 
Research Technology 
Limited 
2003 Socio-economic impact of 24-hour operation of 
Boundary Control Points - The socio-economic 
impact of operation of land boundary control 
points on Hong Kong  
One Country Two 
Systems Research 
Institute Limited 
2002 Study on Corporate Philanthropy in Hong Kong Golin/Harris Forrest  
2000 Bringing the Vision to Life - Hong Kong's 
Long-Term Development Needs and Goals 
The Commission on 
Strategic Development 
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